Joshua Slive

Senior Policy Advisor

Joshua Slive is a Senior Policy Advisor in the Strategic Leadership & Support Division of the Financial Stability Department. He has conducted research and worked on domestic and international policy measures related to the reform of OTC derivatives markets. His research also focuses on market structure and liquidity on trading platforms. Before joining the Bank of Canada, Joshua was on the Finance faculty at the HEC Montreal business school. He has a Ph.D. in Finance from the University of British Columbia.


Joshua Slive

Senior Policy Advisor
Financial Stability
Strategic Leadership and Support

Bank of Canada
234 Wellington Street
Ottawa, ON, K1A 0G9


November 14, 2013 Fragmentation in Canadian Equity Markets

Changes in technology and regulation have resulted in an increasing number of trading venues in equity markets in Canada. New trading platforms have intensified price competition and have encouraged innovation, and they do not appear to have segmented trade. But the increasingly complex market structure has necessitated investments in expensive technology and has introduced new operational risks. Regulatory responses should be carefully adapted to retain the competition and innovation associated with this market fragmentation.

Liquidity and Central Clearing: Evidence from the CDS Market

Staff Working Paper 2012-38 Joshua Slive, Jonathan Witmer, Elizabeth Woodman
An international initiative to increase the use of central clearing for OTC derivatives emerged as one of the reactions to the 2008 financial crisis. The move to central clearing is a fundamental change in the structure of the market.
Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Working Papers Topic(s): Financial markets JEL Code(s): G, G3, G30, G38

November 15, 2012 Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets

Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria.

When Lower Risk Increases Profit: Competition and Control of a Central Counterparty

We model the behavior of dealers in Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives markets where a small number of dealers trade with a continuum of heterogeneous clients (hedgers). Imperfect competition and (endogenous) default induce a familiar trade-off between competition and risk.

See More



  • Liquidity and central clearing: evidence from the credit default swap market,”
    (with Jonathan Witmer and Elizabeth Woodman), 2013, Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures, Volume 112, Issue 1, Pages 91-115, April 2014.
  • “Access to central counterparties: why it matters and how it is changing,”
    (with Timothy Lane and Jean-Philippe Dion), 2013, Banque de France Financial Stability Review No 17.
  • “Estimating the gains from trade in limit-order markets”,
    (with Burton Hollifield, Robert A. Miller and Patrik Sandas), Journal of Finance LXI(6), 2006
  • “Pirated for Profit”,
    (with Dan Bernhardt), Canadian Journal of Economics, 1998.

Publications From Working Groups:

  • “Feasibility study on approaches to aggregate OTC derivatives data”
    Financial Stability Board, 2014.
  • “Macroeconomic impact assessment of OTC derivatives regulatory reforms”
    Bank for International Settlements Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives, 2013.
  • “The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central counterparties in OTC derivatives markets”
    Committee on the Global Financial System Study Group, 2011, CGFS Paper No 46.

Other Research

  • “Price formation and liquidity supply” (2008)
  • “Dynamic Strategies in Limit Order Markets” (2008)
  • “The Diversification Cost of Capital Gains Taxes with Multiple Risky Assets”,
    (with Lorenzo Garlappi and Vasant Naik).
  • “Asymmetric Information in Limit Order Markets” (2002).


  • Ph.D. (Finance) The University of British Columbia

Research Interests

  • Market Microstructure
  • Financial Regulation
  • Financial Stability


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