This paper estimates potential exposures, netting benefits and settlement gains by merging retail and wholesale payments into batches and conducting multiple intraday settlements in this hypothetical model of a single "calibrated payments system." The results demonstrate that credit risk exposures faced by participants in the system are largely dependent on their relative activity in the retail and wholesale payments systems.
Staff Discussion Papers
The increasing importance of risk management in payment systems has led to the development of an array of sophisticated tools designed to mitigate tail risk in these systems. In this paper, we use extreme value theory methods to quantify the level of tail risk in the Canadian retail payment system (ACSS) for the period from 2002 to 2015.
The recent financial crisis has led to the development of new regulations to control risk in designated payment systems, and the implementation of new credit risk management standards is one of the key issues. In this paper, we study various credit risk management schemes for the Canadian retail payment system (ACSS) that are designed to cover the exposure of a defaulting member.
The payments landscape in Canada is rapidly changing and will continue to evolve, fuelled by strong and persistent drivers. In Canada, the Canadian Payments Association (CPA) is on a path to modernize Canada’s core payment systems.
Staff Working Papers
We measure systemic risk in the network of financial market infrastructures (FMIs) as the probability that two or more FMIs have a large credit risk exposure to the same FMI participant.
In the months preceding the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, banks were willing to pay a premium over the Federal Reserve’s discount window (DW) rate to participate in the much less flexible Term Auction Facility (TAF). We empirically test the predictions of a new signalling model that offers a rationale for offering two different liquidity facilities.
This paper provides a framework to compare linked and unlinked CCP configurations in terms of total netting achieved by market participants and the total system default exposures that exist between participants and CCPs.
We model the behavior of dealers in Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives markets where a small number of dealers trade with a continuum of heterogeneous clients (hedgers). Imperfect competition and (endogenous) default induce a familiar trade-off between competition and risk.