Bio

Joshua Slive is Director, Regional Analysis Division, of the Bank of Canada’s Canadian Economic Analysis Department. In this capacity, he oversees the economic analysis and outreach activities of the Bank’s five regional offices (Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Montréal and Halifax). He leads the division in carrying out and publishing the quarterly Business Outlook Survey, conducting regional and sectoral analysis and economic research, and supporting the Bank’s communication strategy.

Previously he was a Senior Policy Advisor in the Bank of Canada’s Financial Stability Department where he was editor of the Bank’s Financial System Review and led the department’s work on financial innovation and fintech. Before joining the Bank of Canada, Joshua was on the Finance faculty at the HEC Montreal business school.


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Staff analytical notes

The potential effect of a central bank digital currency on deposit funding in Canada

Staff Analytical Note 2020-15 Alejandro García, Bena Lands, Xuezhi Liu, Joshua Slive
A retail central bank digital currency denominated in Canadian dollars could, in theory, create competition for bank deposit funding.

Modelling the Macrofinancial Effects of a House Price Correction in Canada

We use a suite of risk-assessment models to examine the possible impact of a hypothetical house price correction, centred in the Toronto and Vancouver areas. We also assume financial stress significantly amplifies the macroeconomic impact of the house price decline.

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Staff working papers

When Lower Risk Increases Profit: Competition and Control of a Central Counterparty

We model the behavior of dealers in Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives markets where a small number of dealers trade with a continuum of heterogeneous clients (hedgers). Imperfect competition and (endogenous) default induce a familiar trade-off between competition and risk.

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Bank publications

Bank of Canada Review articles

November 14, 2013

Fragmentation in Canadian Equity Markets

Changes in technology and regulation have resulted in an increasing number of trading venues in equity markets in Canada. New trading platforms have intensified price competition and have encouraged innovation, and they do not appear to have segmented trade. But the increasingly complex market structure has necessitated investments in expensive technology and has introduced new operational risks. Regulatory responses should be carefully adapted to retain the competition and innovation associated with this market fragmentation.
November 15, 2012

Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets

Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria.

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The Economy, Plain and Simple

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Financial System Hub

November 14, 2018

Financial System Resilience and House Price Corrections

We use models to better understand and assess how risks could affect the financial system. In our hypothetical scenario, a house price correction and elevated financial stress weigh on the economy. An increased number of households and businesses have difficulty repaying loans. Nonetheless, the large banks remain resilient.

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Journal publications

Publications

  • Liquidity and central clearing: evidence from the credit default swap market,”
    (with Jonathan Witmer and Elizabeth Woodman), 2013, Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures, Volume 112, Issue 1, Pages 91-115, April 2014.
  • “Access to central counterparties: why it matters and how it is changing,”
    (with Timothy Lane and Jean-Philippe Dion), 2013, Banque de France Financial Stability Review No 17.
  • “Estimating the gains from trade in limit-order markets”,
    (with Burton Hollifield, Robert A. Miller and Patrik Sandas), Journal of Finance LXI(6), 2006
  • “Pirated for Profit”,
    (with Dan Bernhardt), Canadian Journal of Economics, 1998.

Other

Publications from working groups

  • “Bigtech in Finance: Market developments and potential financial stability implications,”
    Financial Stability Board, 2019.
  • “Third-party dependencies in cloud services: Considerations on financial stability implications,”
    Financial Stability Board, 2019.
  • “Feasibility study on approaches to aggregate OTC derivatives data”
    Financial Stability Board, 2014.
  • “Macroeconomic impact assessment of OTC derivatives regulatory reforms”
    Bank for International Settlements Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives, 2013.
  • “The macrofinancial implications of alternative configurations for access to central counterparties in OTC derivatives markets”
    Committee on the Global Financial System Study Group, 2011, CGFS Paper No 46.

Research

  • “Price formation and liquidity supply” (2008)
  • “Dynamic Strategies in Limit Order Markets” (2008)
  • “The Diversification Cost of Capital Gains Taxes with Multiple Risky Assets”,
    (with Lorenzo Garlappi and Vasant Naik).
  • “Asymmetric Information in Limit Order Markets” (2002).