Staff Analytical Notes



JEL Codes


Published After

Published Before

133 result(s)

BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database: What’s New in 2020?

Staff Analytical Note 2020-13 David Beers, Elliot Jones, John Walsh
The Boc–BoE database of sovereign debt defaults, published and updated annually by the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, provides comprehensive estimates of stocks of government obligations in default. The 2020 edition includes a new section examining the scale of domestic arrears in 2018.

Security of a CBDC

Staff Analytical Note 2020-11 Cyrus Minwalla
Security is an important element in ensuring public confidence in a central bank digital currency (CBDC). This note highlights the required security properties of a CBDC system and the challenges encountered with existing solutions, should the Bank of Canada choose to issue one.

Privacy in CBDC technology

Staff Analytical Note 2020-9 Sriram Darbha, Rakesh Arora
Privacy is a key aspect of a potential central bank digital currency system. We outline different technical choices to enact various privacy models while complying with the appropriate regulations. We develop a framework to evaluate privacy models and list key risks and trade-offs in privacy design.

Household indebtedness risks in the wake of COVID‑19

Staff Analytical Note 2020-8 Olga Bilyk, Anson T. Y. Ho, Mikael Khan, Geneviève Vallée
COVID-19 presents challenges for indebted households. We assess these by drawing parallels between pandemics and natural disasters. Taking into account the financial health of the household sector when the pandemic began, we run model simulations to illustrate how payment deferrals and the labour market recovery will affect mortgage defaults.

Technology Approach for a CBDC

In this note, we highlight a range of technical options and considerations in designing a contingent system for a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in Canada and explore how these options achieve stated public policy goals.

CBDC and Monetary Sovereignty

Staff Analytical Note 2020-5 Antonio Diez de los Rios, Yu Zhu
In an increasingly digitalized world, issuers of private digital currency can weaken central banks’ ability to stabilize the economy. By continuing to make central bank money attractive as a payment instrument in a digital world, a central bank digital currency (CDBC) could help to maintain a country’s monetary sovereignty.

CBDC and Monetary Policy

Staff Analytical Note 2020-4 Mohammad Davoodalhosseini, Francisco Rivadeneyra, Yu Zhu
Improving the conduct of monetary policy is unlikely to be the main motivation for central banks to issue a central bank digital currency (CBDC). While some argue that a CBDC could allow more complex transfer schemes or the ability to break below the zero lower bound, we find these benefits might be small or difficult to realize in practice.