Radoslav Raykov

Principal Analyst

Radoslav Raykov is a Principal Analyst at the Financial Stability Department at the Bank of Canada. He holds a B.A. in Economics from Harvard University and a Ph.D. in Economics from Boston College. Prior to joining the Bank, he worked at the Boston Fed and taught at Harvard University.

His research interests focus broadly on financial stability, and in particular, on: systemic risk, banking regulation and reform, financial reform in derivatives markets and OTC derivatives markets, collateral and moral hazard in financial markets, the insurability of low-probability, high-impact risks, catastrophe insurance and risk diversification, and mechanism design.


Radoslav Raykov

Principal Analyst
Financial Stability
Market Infrastructures Oversight

Bank of Canada
234 Wellington Street
Ottawa, ON, K1A 0G9

Curriculum vitae


Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences

Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov
Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker.
Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Working Papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61

To Share or Not to Share? Uncovered Losses in a Derivatives Clearinghouse

Staff Working Paper 2016-4 Radoslav Raykov
This paper studies how the allocation of residual losses affects trading and welfare in a central counterparty. I compare loss sharing under two loss-allocation mechanisms – variation margin haircutting and cash calls – and study the privately and socially optimal degree of loss sharing.

Optimal Margining and Margin Relief in Centrally Cleared Derivatives Markets

Staff Working Paper 2014-29 Radoslav Raykov
A major policy challenge posed by derivatives clearinghouses is that their collateral requirements can rise sharply in times of stress, reducing market liquidity and further exacerbating downturns.

Uncertain Costs and Vertical Differentiation in an Insurance Duopoly

Staff Working Paper 2014-14 Radoslav Raykov
Classical oligopoly models predict that firms differentiate vertically as a way of softening price competition, but some metrics suggest very little quality differentiation in the U.S. auto insurance market.
Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Working Papers Topic(s): Economic models, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D43, D8, D81, G, G2, G22, L, L2, L22

See More


Refereed Journal


Follow the Bank