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One argument for central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) is that without them, private and foreign digital monies could displace domestic currencies, threatening the central bank’s monetary policy and lender of last resort capabilities. I revisit this monetary sovereignty rationale and offer a wider view—one that considers a broader set of currency functions and captures important cross-country variation.

Does the transmission of monetary policy change when interest rates are low or negative? We shed light on this question by analyzing the international bank lending channels of monetary policy using regulatory data on banks from four small open economies: Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic and Norway.

We assess the response of Government of Canada bond yields to the Bank of Canada’s initial announcement of the Government Bond Purchase Program (GBPP) as well as to the Bank’s later GBPP purchase operations.

Bank of Canada staff are running a “horse race” of alternative monetary policy frameworks in the lead-up to 2021 renewal of the Bank’s monetary policy framework. This paper summarizes some interim results of model simulations from their research.

We discuss the competition and innovation arguments for issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC). A CBDC could be an effective competition policy tool for payments. A CBDC could also support the vibrancy of the digital economy. It could help solve market failures and foster competition and innovation in new digital payments markets.

In this analysis, we use simulations in the Bank of Canada’s projection model—the Terms-of-Trade Economic Model—to consider a suite of extended monetary policies to support the economy following the COVID-19 crisis.

We examine how the eight largest Canadian public pension funds managed liquidity during the market turmoil in March 2020. The funds were generally resilient to large demands for liquidity and relied heavily on Canada's core funding markets.

Unlike the 2008–09 global financial crisis, the onset of the COVID-19 crisis did not raise stress levels in Canada’s Large Value Transfer System. Swift changes to the Bank of Canada’s collateral policy and its large-scale asset purchase programs likely eased liquidity pressures in the system.

This paper surveys and summarizes the literature on how fiscal policy and monetary policy can complement each other in stabilizing economic activity.

We demonstrate the ability of reinforcement learning techniques to estimate the best-response functions of banks participating in high-value payments systems—a real-world strategic game of incomplete information.