- Ph.D, Economics, Universitàt Autonòma de Barcelona, Spain (2015)
- M.Sc., Economics, Universitàt Autonòma de Barcelona, Spain (2011)
- M.Sc. (Diploma), Applied Math, South Ural State University, Russia (2009)
Dmitry Matveev is a Principal Researcher in the Monetary Policy and Financial Studies Division of the Canadian Economic Analysis Department. His research interests include Macroeconomics, Monetary Economics, and Monetary and Fiscal policy. Dmitry has previous experience working as a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Mannheim University, Germany. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Universitàt Autonòma de Barcelona.
Staff analytical notes
The neutral rate in Canada: 2020 updateThe neutral rate of interest is important for central banks because it helps measure the stance of monetary policy. We present updated estimates of the neutral rate in Canada using the most recent data. We expect the COVID-19 pandemic to significantly affect the fundamental drivers of the Canadian neutral rate.
Furor over the Fed : Presidential Tweets and Central Bank IndependenceWe illustrate how market data can be informative about the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. Federal funds futures are private contracts that reflect investor’s expectations about monetary policy decisions.
Staff discussion papers
The Canadian Neutral Rate of Interest through the Lens of an Overlapping-Generations ModelWe use a small open economy model with overlapping generations to evaluate secular dynamics of the neutral rate in Canada from 1980 to 2018. We find that changes in both foreign and domestic factors resulted in a protracted decline in the neutral rate.
Uncertainty and Monetary Policy Experimentation: Empirical Challenges and Insights from Academic LiteratureCentral banks face considerable uncertainty when conducting monetary policy. The COVID-19 pandemic brought this issue back to the forefront of policy discussions. We draw from academic literature to review key sources of uncertainty and how they affect the conduct of monetary policy.
Complementarities Between Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy—Literature ReviewThis paper surveys and summarizes the literature on how fiscal policy and monetary policy can complement each other in stabilizing economic activity.
Staff working papers
The Central Bank Strikes Back! Credibility of Monetary Policy under Fiscal InfluenceCentral banks in many advanced economies enjoy a high degree of independence, which protects monetary policy decisions from political influence. But how should independent central banks react if pressured by fiscal policy-makers? We examine whether a central bank should design a monetary policy framework that prescribes acting conditionally on how fiscal policy behaves.
Tariffs and the Exchange Rate: Evidence from TwitterDo tariffs affect exchange rates? We look at President Trump’s tweets during talks on the North American Free Trade Agreement and find that anticipation of higher tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico led to an appreciation of the US dollar relative to Canadian and Mexican currency.
Monetary Policy and Government Debt Dynamics Without CommitmentI show that maturity considerations affect the optimal conduct of monetary and fiscal policy during a period of government debt reduction. I consider a New Keynesian model and study a dynamic game of monetary and fiscal policy authorities without commitment, characterizing the incentives that drive the choice of interest rate.
Do Survey Expectations of Stock Returns Reflect Risk Adjustments?Motivated by the observation that survey expectations of stock returns are inconsistent with rational return expectations under real-world probabilities, we investigate whether alternative expectations hypotheses entertained in the literature on asset pricing are consistent with the survey evidence.
Time-Consistent Management of a Liquidity Trap with Government DebtThis paper studies optimal discretionary monetary and fiscal policy when the lower bound on nominal interest rates is occasionally binding in a model with nominal rigidities and long-term government debt. At the lower bound it is optimal for the government to temporarily reduce debt.
- "The Central Bank Strikes Back! Credibility of Monetary Policy under Fiscal Influence"
(with Antoine Camous), Economic Journal, Vol. 133, pp. 1–29, January 2023.
- "Time-Consistent Management of a Liquidity Trap with Government Debt"
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 53, pp. 2129–2165, December 2021.
- "Furor over the Fed: A President's Tweets and Central Bank Independence"
(with Antoine Camous), CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 67, pp. 106–127, March 2021.
- "Do Survey Expectations of Stock Returns Reflect Risk-Adjustments?"
(with Klaus Adam and Stefan Nagel), Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 117, pp. 723–740, January 2021.