Martin Kuncl is a Senior Economist in the Canadian Economic Analysis Department at the Bank of Canada. His research interests include macro-financial linkages, financial crises and macro-prudential policies. Specific topics include financial innovation, interaction of monetary and macro-prudential policies, and government intervention in the mortgage market. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from CERGE-EI.
Staff analytical notes
Using a structural model, we study the economic consequences of the COVID-19 shock. The uneven consequences, such as higher unemployment among young households, amplify the negative implications for the macroeconomy, household vulnerabilities and consumption inequality. Government support programs have stimulated the economy and lowered inequality and medium-term vulnerabilities.
We expect potential output growth to be higher than in the October 2020 reassessment. By 2024, growth will be slightly above its average growth from 2010 to 2019. We assess that the Canadian nominal neutral rate continues to lie in the range of 1.75 to 2.75 percent.
During the period of 2008 to 2012, the rules for government-backed mortgage insurance were tightened on four occasions. In this note, we estimate the effects through a simple econometric exercise using a vector error-correction model (VECM).
Staff working papers
Monetary policy in the presence of nominal debt and labour supply heterogeneity creates a policy trade-off: a short-term economic stimulus leads to persistently reduced output over the medium term. Price-level targeting weakens this trade-off and is better able to stabilize inflation and output than inflation targeting.
We examine loan insurance—credit risk transfer upon origination—in a model in which lenders can screen, learn loan quality over time, and can sell loans. Some lenders with low screening ability insure, benefiting from higher market liquidity of insured loans while forgoing the option to exploit future information about loan quality.
Markets for securitized assets were characterized by high liquidity prior to the recent financial crisis and by a sudden market dry-up at the onset of the crisis. A general equilibrium model with heterogeneous investment opportunities and information frictions predicts that, in boom periods or mild recessions, the degree of adverse selection in resale markets for securitized assets is limited because of the reputation-based guarantees by asset originators.
This paper studies the efficiency of financial intermediation through securitization in a model with heterogeneous investment projects and asymmetric information about the quality of securitized assets. I show that when retaining part of the risk, the issuer of securitized assets may credibly signal its quality.
- “Securitization under Asymmetric Information over the Business Cycle”, European Economic Review, Volume 111, January 2019, Pages 237-256.