Jonathan Chiu

Senior Research Advisor

Jonathan Chiu is a Senior Research Advisor in the Funds Management and Banking Department (FBD). His main research interests concern monetary theory, banking, payments and financial infrastructures. He also teaches monetary theory at Queen’s University. Jonathan received his PhD in economics from the University of Western Ontario.


Jonathan Chiu

Senior Research Advisor
Funds Management and Banking

Bank of Canada
234 Wellington Street
Ottawa, ON, K1A 0G9


Relationships in the Interbank Market

Staff Working Paper 2016-33 Jonathan Chiu, Cyril Monnet
The market for central bank reserves is mainly over-the-counter and exhibits a core-periphery network structure. This paper develops a model of relationship lending in the unsecured interbank market. In equilibrium, a tiered lending network arises endogenously as banks choose to build relationships to insure against liquidity shocks and to economize on the cost to trade in the interbank market.

On the Essentiality of E-Money

Staff Working Paper 2015-43 Jonathan Chiu, Tsz-Nga Wong
Recent years have witnessed the advances of e-money systems such as Bitcoin, PayPal and various forms of stored-value cards. This paper adopts a mechanism design approach to identify some essential features of different payment systems that implement and improve the constrained optimal resource allocation.

Public Policy Objectives and the Next Generation of CPA Systems: An Analytical Framework

Staff Discussion Paper 2015-6 James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, Sajjad Jafri, Héctor Pérez Saiz
The payments landscape in Canada is rapidly changing and will continue to evolve, fuelled by strong and persistent drivers. In Canada, the Canadian Payments Association (CPA) is on a path to modernize Canada’s core payment systems.

E-Money: Efficiency, Stability and Optimal Policy

Staff Working Paper 2014-16 Jonathan Chiu, Tsz-Nga Wong
What makes e-money more special than cash? Is the introduction of e-money necessarily welfare enhancing? Is an e-money system necessarily stable? What is the optimal way to design an efficient and stable e-money scheme?

On the Welfare Effects of Credit Arrangements

Staff Working Paper 2012-43 Jonathan Chiu, Mei Dong, Enchuan Shao
This paper studies the welfare effects of different credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, a deviation from the Friedman rule is always sub-optimal. Moreover, credit arrangements can be welfare-reducing, because increased consumption by credit users will drive up the price level so that money users have to reduce consumption when facing a binding liquidity restraint.

See More


Journal Articles

Other Research

  • “The Economics of Cryptocurrencies – Bitcoin and Beyond”
    (with Thorsten Koeppl).
  • “Relationships in the Interbank Market”
     (with Cyril Monnet).
  • “Short-run Dynamics in a Search-Theoretic Model of Monetary Exchange”
    (with Miguel Molico).


  • Ph.D. in Economics, University of Western Ontario, 2005

Research Interests

  • Monetary Economics
  • Payments Economics
  • Banking


Follow the Bank