Bio

Jonathan Chiu is a Senior Research Advisor in the Funds Management and Banking Department (FBD). His main research interests concern monetary theory, banking, payments and financial infrastructures. He also teaches monetary theory at Queen’s University. Jonathan received his PhD in economics from the University of Western Ontario.


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Staff Discussion Papers

Public Policy Objectives and the Next Generation of CPA Systems: An Analytical Framework

Staff Discussion Paper 2015-6 James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, Sajjad Jafri, Héctor Pérez Saiz
The payments landscape in Canada is rapidly changing and will continue to evolve, fuelled by strong and persistent drivers. In Canada, the Canadian Payments Association (CPA) is on a path to modernize Canada’s core payment systems.

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Staff Working Papers

Bank Market Power and Central Bank Digital Currency: Theory and Quantitative Assessment

Many central banks are considering whether to issue a new form of electronic money that would be accessible to the public. This new form is usually called a central bank digital currency (CBDC). Issuing a CBDC would have implications for the financial system and, more broadly, the wider economy.

Blockchain-Based Settlement for Asset Trading

Staff Working Paper 2018-45 Jonathan Chiu, Thorsten Koeppl
Can securities be settled on a blockchain and, if so, what are the gains relative to existing settlement systems? We consider a blockchain that ensures delivery versus payment by linking transfers of assets with payments and operates using a proof-of-work protocol. The main benefit of a blockchain is faster and more flexible settlement, whereas the challenge is to avoid settlement fails when participants fork the chain to get rid of trading losses.

Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain

Staff Working Paper 2018-34 Jonathan Chiu, Thorsten Koeppl
A blockchain is a digital ledger that keeps track of a record of ownership without the need for a designated party to update and enforce changes to the record. The updating of the ledger is done directly by the users of the blockchain and is traditionally governed by a proof-of-work (PoW) protocol.

On the Essentiality of E-Money

Staff Working Paper 2015-43 Jonathan Chiu, Tsz-Nga Wong
Recent years have witnessed the advances of e-money systems such as Bitcoin, PayPal and various forms of stored-value cards. This paper adopts a mechanism design approach to identify some essential features of different payment systems that implement and improve the constrained optimal resource allocation.

E-Money: Efficiency, Stability and Optimal Policy

Staff Working Paper 2014-16 Jonathan Chiu, Tsz-Nga Wong
What makes e-money more special than cash? Is the introduction of e-money necessarily welfare enhancing? Is an e-money system necessarily stable? What is the optimal way to design an efficient and stable e-money scheme?

On the Welfare Effects of Credit Arrangements

Staff Working Paper 2012-43 Jonathan Chiu, Mei Dong, Enchuan Shao
This paper studies the welfare effects of different credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, a deviation from the Friedman rule is always sub-optimal. Moreover, credit arrangements can be welfare-reducing, because increased consumption by credit users will drive up the price level so that money users have to reduce consumption when facing a binding liquidity restraint.

Trading Dynamics with Adverse Selection and Search: Market Freeze, Intervention and Recovery

Staff Working Paper 2011-30 Jonathan Chiu, Thorsten Koeppl
We study the trading dynamics in an asset market where the quality of assets is private information of the owner and finding a counterparty takes time. When trading of a financial asset ceases in equilibrium as a response to an adverse shock to asset quality, a large player can resurrect the market by buying up lemons which involves assuming financial losses.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial stability JEL Code(s): E, E6, G, G1

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Bank Publications

Bank of Canada Review articles

November 17, 2011

Liquidity Provision and Collateral Haircuts in Payments Systems

Central banks play a pivotal role in well-functioning payments systems by providing liquidity via collateralized lending. This article discusses the role of collateral and haircut policy in central bank lending, as well as the distinguishing features of the central bank’s policy relative to private sector practices. It presents a model that explicitly incorporates the unique role of central banks in the payments system and argues that central banks must consider how their haircut policies affect the relative price and liquidity of assets, the market’s asset allocation, and the likelihood of participants to default. Furthermore, under extraordinary circumstances, there is a rationale for the central bank to temporarily reduce haircuts or broaden the list of eligible collateral to mitigate the shortage of liquidity in the market.

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Journal Publications

Journal articles

Other

Book chapter

Research