Bio

Jonathan Chiu is a Senior Research Advisor in the Banking and Payments Department (BAP). His main research interests concern monetary theory, banking, payments and financial infrastructures. He also teaches monetary theory at Queen’s University. Jonathan received his PhD in economics from the University of Western Ontario.


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Staff discussion papers

Public Policy Objectives and the Next Generation of CPA Systems: An Analytical Framework

Staff Discussion Paper 2015-6 James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, Sajjad Jafri, Héctor Pérez Saiz
The payments landscape in Canada is rapidly changing and will continue to evolve, fuelled by strong and persistent drivers. In Canada, the Canadian Payments Association (CPA) is on a path to modernize Canada’s core payment systems.

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Staff working papers

PayTech and the D(ata) N(etwork) A(ctivities) of BigTech Platforms

Staff Working Paper 2022-35 Jonathan Chiu, Thorsten Koeppl
Why do BigTech platforms introduce payment services? We explore this using a model in which a monopoly platform faces a trade-off between the costs associated with privacy concerns and the revenue from data services. We then analyze the feedback effects between data and payments.

Central Bank Digital Currency and Banking: Macroeconomic Benefits of a Cash-Like Design

Staff Working Paper 2021-63 Jonathan Chiu, Mohammad Davoodalhosseini
Should a CBDC be more like cash or bank deposits? An interest-bearing, cash-like CBDC not only makes payments more efficient but also increases total demand. This has positive effects on other transactions, inducing more deposit taking and lending and, thus, bank intermediation.

Safe Payments

In a cashless economy, would the private sector invest in the optimal level of safety in a deposit-based payment system? In general, because of externalities, the answer is no. While the private sector could over- or under-invest in safety, the government can use taxes or subsidies to correct private incentives.

Bank Market Power and Central Bank Digital Currency: Theory and Quantitative Assessment

We show that issuing a deposit-like central bank digital currency (CBDC) with a proper interest rate would encourage banks to pay higher interest to keep their customers. Banks would then attract more deposits and offer more loans. Hence, a CBDC would not necessarily crowd out private banking.

Blockchain-Based Settlement for Asset Trading

Staff Working Paper 2018-45 Jonathan Chiu, Thorsten Koeppl
Can securities be settled on a blockchain and, if so, what are the gains relative to existing settlement systems? We consider a blockchain that ensures delivery versus payment by linking transfers of assets with payments and operates using a proof-of-work protocol. The main benefit of a blockchain is faster and more flexible settlement, whereas the challenge is to avoid settlement fails when participants fork the chain to get rid of trading losses.

Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain

Staff Working Paper 2018-34 Jonathan Chiu, Thorsten Koeppl
A blockchain is a digital ledger that keeps track of a record of ownership without the need for a designated party to update and enforce changes to the record. The updating of the ledger is done directly by the users of the blockchain and is traditionally governed by a proof-of-work (PoW) protocol.

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Bank publications

Bank of Canada Review articles

November 17, 2011

Liquidity Provision and Collateral Haircuts in Payments Systems

Central banks play a pivotal role in well-functioning payments systems by providing liquidity via collateralized lending. This article discusses the role of collateral and haircut policy in central bank lending, as well as the distinguishing features of the central bank’s policy relative to private sector practices. It presents a model that explicitly incorporates the unique role of central banks in the payments system and argues that central banks must consider how their haircut policies affect the relative price and liquidity of assets, the market’s asset allocation, and the likelihood of participants to default. Furthermore, under extraordinary circumstances, there is a rationale for the central bank to temporarily reduce haircuts or broaden the list of eligible collateral to mitigate the shortage of liquidity in the market.

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Journal publications

Journal articles

Other

Book chapter

Research