Cyril Monnet

This paper develops a general equilibrium model to assess central bank digital currency (CBDC) design in a monetary system where traditional banks and “crypto banks” (i.e., banks that issue stablecoins) coexist. We compare tokenized and non-tokenized CBDC, showing that their desirability depends on the reliability of private money provision, the availability of collateral assets and the features of the crypto sector.

Central bankers argue that programmable digital currencies may compromise the uniformity of money. We develop a stylized model to examine this argument and the trade-offs involved in circulating programmable money.

This paper explores the implications of introducing digital public and private monies (e.g. tokenized central bank digital currency [CBDC] or tokenized deposits) for stablecoins and illicit crypto transactions.

In the interbank market, banks will sometimes trade below the central bank's deposit rate. We explain this anomaly using a theory based on market frictions and relationship lending.