Yu Zhu


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Staff Analytical Notes

CBDC and Monetary Sovereignty

Staff Analytical Note 2020-5 Antonio Diez de los Rios, Yu Zhu
In an increasingly digitalized world, issuers of private digital currency can weaken central banks’ ability to stabilize the economy. By continuing to make central bank money attractive as a payment instrument in a digital world, a central bank digital currency (CDBC) could help to maintain a country’s monetary sovereignty.

CBDC and Monetary Policy

Staff Analytical Note 2020-4 Mohammad Davoodalhosseini, Francisco Rivadeneyra, Yu Zhu
Improving the conduct of monetary policy is unlikely to be the main motivation for central banks to issue a central bank digital currency (CBDC). While some argue that a CBDC could allow more complex transfer schemes or the ability to break below the zero lower bound, we find these benefits might be small or difficult to realize in practice.

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Staff Working Papers

Bank Market Power and Central Bank Digital Currency: Theory and Quantitative Assessment

Many central banks are considering whether to issue a new form of electronic money that would be accessible to the public. This new form is usually called a central bank digital currency (CBDC). Issuing a CBDC would have implications for the financial system and, more broadly, the wider economy.

Frictional Capital Reallocation I: Ex Ante Heterogeneity

Staff Working Paper 2019-4 Randall Wright, Sylvia Xiaolin Xiao, Yu Zhu
This paper studies dynamic general equilibrium models where firms trade capital in frictional markets. Gains from trade arise due to ex ante heterogeneity: some firms are better at investment, so they build capital in the primary market; others acquire it in the secondary market.
Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Working Papers Topic(s): Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E2, E22, E4, E44

A Framework for Analyzing Monetary Policy in an Economy with E-money

Staff Working Paper 2019-1 Yu Zhu, Scott Hendry
This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and may deviate from the Friedman rule; (2) multiple equilibria may exist; (3) when the economy approaches a cashless state, the central bank’s optimal policy improves the market power of the e-money issuer and can lead to a discrete decrease in welfare and a discrete increase in inflation; and (4) first best cannot be achieved.

Identification and Estimation of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions with Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity

Staff Working Paper 2016-23 Serafin Grundl, Yu Zhu
This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models.
Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Working Papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods JEL Code(s): C, C1, C14, C5, C57, D, D4, D44, L, L0, L00

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