Janet Hua Jiang
Research Director
- PhD Simon Fraser University (2007)
Bio
Janet Jiang is the Research Director of the Research Team in the Banking and Payments Department. Janet obtained her PhD in Economics from Simon Fraser University in 2007. She builds theoretical models and runs surveys and controlled laboratory experiments to study inflation, asset trading, bank runs, currency competition, payment competition and central bank digital currencies.
Her work has been published in Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Review of Economic Dynamics, Canadian Journal of Economics, European Economic Review, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, and Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
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Staff analytical notes
Staff discussion papers
Central Bank Digital Currencies and Banking: Literature Review and New Questions
We review the nascent but fast-growing literature on central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), focusing on their potential impacts on private banks. We evaluate these impacts in three areas of traditional banking: payments, lending and liquidity and maturity transformation. We also take a broader look at CBDCs and highlight two promising directions for future research.Staff working papers
Inflation, Output, and Welfare in the Laboratory
We investigate the effect of inflation on output and welfare in the laboratory. Consistent with monetary theory, we find that inflation acts as a tax on monetary exchange and reduces output and welfare.How Long is Forever in the Laboratory? Three Implementations of an Infinite-Horizon Monetary Economy
Standard monetary models adopt an infinite horizon with discounting. Testing these models in the lab requires implementing this horizon within a limited time frame. We compare three approaches to such an implementation and discuss their relative advantages.Monetary Policy Pass-Through with Central Bank Digital Currency
Many central banks are considering issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC). This would introduce a new policy tool—interest on CBDC. We investigate how this new tool would interact with traditional monetary policy tools, such as the interest on central bank reserves.Safe Payments
In a cashless economy, would the private sector invest in the optimal level of safety in a deposit-based payment system? In general, because of externalities, the answer is no. While the private sector could over- or under-invest in safety, the government can use taxes or subsidies to correct private incentives.Bank Market Power and Central Bank Digital Currency: Theory and Quantitative Assessment
We show that issuing a deposit-like central bank digital currency (CBDC) with a proper interest rate would encourage banks to pay higher interest to keep their customers. Banks would then attract more deposits and offer more loans. Hence, a CBDC would not necessarily crowd out private banking.Competing Currencies in the Laboratory
We investigate competition between two intrinsically worthless currencies as a result of decentralized interactions between human subjects. We design a laboratory experiment based on a simple two-country, two-currency search model to study factors that affect circulation patterns and equilibrium selection.Adoption of a New Payment Method: Theory and Experimental Evidence
We model the introduction of a new payment method, e.g., e-money, that competes with an existing payment method, e.g., cash. The new payment method involves relatively lower per-transaction costs for both buyers and sellers, but sellers must pay a fixed fee to accept the new payment method.Understanding the Cash Demand Puzzle
We develop a model to explain a puzzling trend in cash demand in recent years: the value of bank notes in circulation as a percentage of GDP has remained stable despite decreasing cash usage at points of sale owing to competition from alternative means of payment such as credit cards.Interest on Cash, Fundamental Value Process and Bubble Formation on Experimental Asset Markets
We study the formation of price bubbles on experimental asset markets where cash earns interest. There are two main conclusions.Do Sunspots Matter? Evidence from an Experimental Study of Bank Runs
A "sunspot" is a variable that has no direct impact on the economy’s fundamental condition, such as preferences, endowments or technologies, but may nonetheless affect economic outcomes through the expectations channel as a coordination device. This paper investigates how people react to sunspots in the context of a bank-run game in a controlled laboratory environment.Journal publications
Journal articles
- “One or Two Monies?”
(with Mei Dong), 2010, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol.57, p.439-450. - “Banking Crises in Monetary Economies”,
2008, the Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 41, p.80-104. - “Experimental Evidence of Bank Runs as Pure Coordination Failures”,
(with Jasmina Arifovic and Yiping Xu), 2012, Revised and Resubmitted to Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - “Money and Price Posting under Private Information”,
(with Mei Dong), Journal of Economic Theory (2014) 150, 740-777.
Other
Research
- Eliminating Laboratory Asset Bubbles by Paying Interest on Cash,
(with Giovanni Giusti and Yiping Xu) - Mechanism Design and Competitive Markets in a Quasi-linear Environment with Limited Commitment
- Information, Prices and Ex-ante Investment,
(with Mei Dong)