Net Send Limits in the Lynx Payment System: Usage and Implications Staff discussion paper 2025-13 Virgilio B Pasin, Anna Wyllie We study how participants in the Lynx payment system use the net send limit (NSL) tool to control their intraday payment outflow levels. Our results show that participants typically adopt a “set it and forget it” approach to scheduling NSLs and sometimes have distinct intraday NSL adjustment behaviours. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers JEL Code(s): C, C1, C10, D, D8, D82, E, E4, E42, E5, E58, G, G2, G21, G4, G41 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Money and payments, Payment and financial market infrastructures
On the Programmability and Uniformity of Digital Currencies Staff working paper 2025-18 Jonathan Chiu, Cyril Monnet Central bankers argue that programmable digital currencies may compromise the uniformity of money. We develop a stylized model to examine this argument and the trade-offs involved in circulating programmable money. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): E, E5, E50, E58 Research Theme(s): Money and payments, Digital assets and fintech, Payment and financial market infrastructures
Assessing the US and Canadian neutral rates: 2025 update Staff analytical note 2025-16 Frida Adjalala, Felipe Alves, William Beaudoin, Hélène Desgagnés, Wei Dong, Ingomar Krohn, Jan David Schneider We assess both the US and Canadian nominal neutral rates to be in the range of 2.25% to 3.25%, unchanged from the range assessed in 2024. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): E, E4, E40, E43, E5, E50, E52, E58, F, F4, F41 Research Theme(s): Models and tools, Economic models, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission, Real economy and forecasting, Structural challenges, Demographics and labour supply
The Optimum Quantity of Central Bank Reserves Staff working paper 2025-15 Jonathan Witmer This paper analyzes the optimal quantity of central bank reserves in an economy where reserves and other financial assets provide liquidity benefits. Using a static model, I derive a constrained Friedman rule that characterizes the socially optimal level of reserves, demonstrating that this quantity is neither necessarily large nor small but depends on the marginal benefits of reserves relative to alternative safe assets. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): E, E4, E41, E42, E5, E58, G, G2, G21, G28 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Monetary policy, Monetary policy tools and implementation
March 17, 2025 Will asset managers dash for cash? A summary of the implications for central banks David Cimon, Jean-Philippe Dion, Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Jabir Sandhu We consider ways central banks could adapt in the event of an increased risk of a dash for cash from asset managers. We explore ideas such as new facilities that ease asset managers’ ability to convert existing assets to cash or new assets with liquidity that central banks would guarantee. Content Type(s): Publications, Financial System Hub articles JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, G, G0, G00, G01, G1, G2
Will Asset Managers Dash for Cash? Implications for Central Banks Staff discussion paper 2025-5 David Cimon, Jean-Philippe Dion, Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Jabir Sandhu We consider ways central banks could adapt in the event of an increased risk of a dash for cash from asset managers. We explore ideas such as new facilities that ease asset managers’ ability to convert existing assets to cash or new assets with liquidity that central banks would guarantee. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, G, G0, G00, G01, G1, G2 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk, Monetary policy, Monetary policy tools and implementation
The Contingent Term Repo Facility: Lessons learned and an update Staff analytical note 2025-12 Jessie Ziqing Chen, Parnell Chu, Scott Kinnear In 2024, the Bank of Canada reviewed and updated its Contingent Term Repo Facility policy, incorporating lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic and other global market developments, such as the UK gilt crisis in September 2022. This paper accompanies the March 17, 2025, Contingent Term Repo Facility market notice and provides background information and further details about the design of the revised policy. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, F, F6, F68, G, G0, G01, G2, G23 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk, Monetary policy, Monetary policy tools and implementation
Effects of macroprudential policy announcements on perceptions of systemic risks Staff analytical note 2025-4 Thibaut Duprey, Victoria Fernandes, Kerem Tuzcuoglu, Ruhani Walia We introduce a history of macroprudential policy (MPP) events in Canada since the 1980s. We document the short-run effects of MPP announcements on market-based measures of systemic risk and find that MPPs can influence the market’s perception of large banks’ resilience. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, G, G2, G21, G28, G3, G32 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight
Interaction of Macroprudential and Monetary Policies: Practice Ahead of Theory Staff discussion paper 2024-18 Thibaut Duprey, Yaz Terajima, Jing Yang We draw on the Canadian experience to examine how monetary and macroprudential policies interact and possibly complement each other in achieving their respective price and financial stability objectives. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers JEL Code(s): E, E3, E37, E5, E52, E58, E6, E61, G, G0, G01, G2, G21, G28 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Household and business credit, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission
How foreign central banks can affect liquidity in the Government of Canada bond market Staff analytical note 2024-26 Patrick Aldridge, Jabir Sandhu, Sofia Tchamova We find that foreign central banks own a large share of Government of Canada (GoC) bonds and tend to hold their positions for longer than other types of asset managers. This buy-and-hold behaviour could offer benefits. For example, foreign central banks may be less likely than other asset managers to sell bonds and add to strains on market liquidity in periods of turmoil. However, foreign central banks’ buy-and-hold behaviour combined with their minimal lending of GoC bonds in securities-financing markets, as observed in our available data, can potentially lower liquidity because fewer GoC bonds are available for others to transact in secondary markets. Indeed, we find that higher levels of foreign central banks’ GoC bond holdings are related to lower liquidity. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, F, F3, F30, F31, G, G0, G01, G1, G11, G12, G15, G2, G23 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk