Alex is a Senior Economist. His primary research interests are in Microeconomics and Industrial Organization with focus on empirical dynamic models of consumer and producer behavior.

Staff working papers

Equilibrium in Two-Sided Markets for Payments: Consumer Awareness and the Welfare Cost of the Interchange Fee

Staff Working Paper 2022-15 Kim Huynh, Gradon Nicholls, Oleksandr Shcherbakov
We construct and estimate a structural two-stage model of equilibrium in a market for payments in order to quantify the network externalities and identify the main determinants of consumer and merchant decisions.

Welfare Analysis of Equilibria With and Without Early Termination Fees in the US Wireless Industry

Staff Working Paper 2020-9 Joseph Cullen, Nicolas Schutz, Oleksandr Shcherbakov
The elimination of long-term contracts and early termination fees (ETFs) in the US wireless industry at the end of 2015 increased monthly service fees by 2 to 5 percent. Nevertheless, consumers are clearly better off without ETFs. While firms’ revenues from ETFs vanish, their profits from monthly fees increase. As a result, the overall effect on producer profits is less clear.

Demand for Payment Services and Consumer Welfare: The Introduction of a Central Bank Digital Currency

Using a two-stage model, we study the determinants of Canadian consumers’ choices of payment method at the point of sale. We estimate consumer preferences and adoption costs for various combinations of payment methods. We analyze how introducing a central bank digital currency would affect the market equilibrium.

Explaining the Interplay Between Merchant Acceptance and Consumer Adoption in Two-Sided Markets for Payment Methods

Staff Working Paper 2019-32 Kim Huynh, Gradon Nicholls, Oleksandr Shcherbakov
Recent consumer and merchant surveys show a decrease in the use of cash at the point of sale. Increasingly, consumers and merchants have access to a growing array of payment innovations as substitutes for cash.

Identifying the Degree of Collusion Under Proportional Reduction

Staff Working Paper 2017-51 Oleksandr Shcherbakov, Naoki Wakamori
Proportional reduction is a common cartel practice in which cartel members reduce their output proportionately. We develop a method to quantify this reduction relative to a benchmark market equilibrium scenario and relate the reduction to the traditional conduct parameter.

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Journal publications

Refereed journals

  • "Measuring consumer switching costs in the television industry". RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.47, No.2, Summer 2016, pp.366-393.
  • "Quality overprovision in cable television markets"
    (with Gregory Crawford and Matthew Shum). American Economic Review. Vol.109. No.3, forthcoming.


Work in progress

  • "Firm-level investment under imperfect capital markets in Ukraine". Revise and Resubmit to JEMS.
  • "Explaining the interplay between acceptance and usage of payment methods in two-sided markets"
    (with Kim P. Huynh and Gradon Nicholls).
  • "Welfare analysis of equilibria with and without early termination fees in the U.S. wireless industry"
    (with Nicolas Schutz and Joseph Cullen).
  • "Government regulation as collusion facilitating device: evidence from Ukrainian white sugar industry in 1993-2000".
  • "Measuring consumer switching costs in the wireless industry"
    (with Joseph Cullen).
  • "Identifying collusion under proportional reduction"
    (with Naoki Wakamori)
  • "Demand for payment services"
    (with Kim P. Huynh and Jozsef Molnar)