E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies

• Liquidity Usage and Payment Delay Estimates of the New Canadian High Value Payments System

  Staff Discussion Paper 2020-9 Francisco Rivadeneyra, Nellie Zhang

  As part of modernizing its core payments infrastructure, Canada will replace the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) with a new Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system called Lynx. An important question for policy-makers is how Lynx should be designed.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial services, Financial system regulation and policies, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C5, E, E4, E42, E5, E58

• Why Do Central Banks Make Public Announcements of Open Market Operations?

  Staff Working Paper 2020-35 Narayan Bulusu

  Central banks communicate the results of open market operations. This helps participants in financial markets more accurately estimate the prevailing demand and supply conditions in the market for overnight loans.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Central bank research, Monetary policy implementation JEL Code(s): D, D5, D52, E, E5, E58, G, G2, G21

• Strengthening Inflation Targeting: Review and Renewal Processes in Canada and Other Advanced Jurisdictions

  Staff Discussion Paper 2020-7 Robert Amano, Thomas J. Carter, Lawrence L. Schembri

  We summarize the review and renewal process at four central banks (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bank of England, Sveriges Riksbank and the US Federal Reserve Bank) and compare them with the process at the Bank of Canada, which has been well-established since 2001.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Central bank research, Inflation targets, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): E, E5, E52, E58

• Primary Dealers and the Demand for Government Debt

  Staff Working Paper 2020-29 Jason Allen, Jakub Kastl, Milena Wittwer

  The main objectives of debt management are to raise stable and low-cost funding to meet the government’s financial needs and to maintain a well-functioning market for government securities.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Debt management, Financial markets JEL Code(s): C, C1, C14, D, D4, D44, E, E5, E58, G, G1, G12

• CBDC adoption and usage: some insights from field and laboratory experiments

  Staff Analytical Note 2020-12 Janet Hua Jiang

  This note discusses insights from historical launches of new payment methods and related laboratory experiments on the potential adoption and use of a central bank digital currency in the Canadian context.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Central bank research, Digital currencies and fintech JEL Code(s): C, C9, E, E4, E5, E58

• CBDC and Monetary Sovereignty

  Staff Analytical Note 2020-5 Antonio Diez de los Rios, Yu Zhu

  In an increasingly digitalized world, issuers of private digital currency can weaken central banks’ ability to stabilize the economy. By continuing to make central bank money attractive as a payment instrument in a digital world, a central bank digital currency (CDBC) could help to maintain a country’s monetary sovereignty.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Digital currencies and fintech, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E5, E52, E58, F, F5, F55, G, G1, G15

• The Power of Helicopter Money Revisited: A New Keynesian Perspective

  Staff Discussion Paper 2020-1 Thomas J. Carter, Rhys R. Mendes

  We analyze money financing of fiscal transfers (helicopter money) in two simple New Keynesian models: a “textbook” model in which all money is non-interest-bearing (e.g., all money is currency), and a more realistic model with interest-bearing reserves.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Credibility, Economic models, Fiscal policy, Inflation targets, Interest rates, Monetary policy, Monetary policy and uncertainty, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): E, E1, E12, E4, E41, E43, E5, E51, E52, E58, E6, E61, E63

• Managing GDP Tail Risk

  Staff Working Paper 2020-3 Thibaut Duprey, Alexander Ueberfeldt

  Models for macroeconomic forecasts do not usually take into account the risk of a crisis—that is, a sudden large decline in gross domestic product (GDP). However, policy-makers worry about such GDP tail risk because of its large social and economic costs.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Central bank research, Economic models, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Interest rates, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): D, D8, E, E4, E44, E5, E52, E58, G, G0, G01

• Furor over the Fed : Presidential Tweets and Central Bank Independence

  Staff Analytical Note 2019-33 Antoine Camous, Dmitry Matveev

  We illustrate how market data can be informative about the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. Federal funds futures are private contracts that reflect investor’s expectations about monetary policy decisions.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Central bank research, Credibility, Financial markets, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E5, E52, E58

• An Application of Shapley Value Cost Allocation to Liquidity Savings Mechanisms

  Staff Working Paper 2019-26 Rod Garratt

  Liquidity demands in real-time gross settlement payment systems can be enormous. To reduce the liquidity requirement, central banks around the world have implemented liquidity savings mechanisms (LSMs).

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C7, C72, E, E5, E58