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We share insights from Canadian data from 2002 to 2022 that the Bank of Canada collected. The Bank submits these data each year to the Financial Stability Board for inclusion in its Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation.

Across several dimensions of lender of last resort policy, I highlight broad changes that have occurred since the 2008–09 global financial crisis and discuss some of the key challenges, choices and considerations facing the designers of central bank liquidity tools today.

In March 2020, the Bank of Canada implemented the Government of Canada Bond Purchase Program, eventually purchasing approximately $340 billion of government bonds. In this paper, we analyze the impact of this program on financial market prices and yields as well as on GDP and inflation.

We examine systemic risks within the Canadian banking sector, decomposing them into three contribution channels: contagion, common exposures, and idiosyncratic risk. Through a structural model, we dissect how interbank relationships and market conditions contribute to systemic risk, providing new insights for financial stability.

We study liquidity requirements in a framework with fire sales. The framework nests three common pricing mechanisms and produces the same observables. Absent risk-sharing considerations, the equilibrium is efficient with cash-in-the-market pricing; a liquidity requirement is optimal with second-best-use pricing; and a liquidity ceiling (i.e., a cap on liquid assets) is optimal with adverse selection.

We examine how life insurers manage liquidity risks created by their business model. We find that Canadian life insurers did not face significant liquidity draws and continued their usual investment behaviour during the COVID-19 crisis and as interest rates increased in 2022.

We investigate the unintended consequences of the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP). Originally designed to help borrowers refinance after the 2008–09 global financial crisis, HARP inadvertently strengthened the market power of incumbent lenders by creating a cost advantage for them. Despite a 2013 policy rectifying this cost advantage, we still find significant welfare losses for borrowers.

We examine the optimal amount of user anonymity in a central bank digital currency in the context of bank lending. Anonymity, defined as the lender’s inability to discern an entrepreneur’s actions that enable fund diversion, influences the choice of payment instrument due to its impact on a bank’s lending decisions.

I investigate how monetary policy transmits to mortgage rates via the mortgage market concentration channel for both traditional and shadow banks in the United States from 2009 to 2019. On average, shadow and traditional banks exhibit only a slight disparity in transmitting monetary shocks to mortgage rates.

Do banks realize simultaneous trading losses because they invest in the same assets, or because different assets are subject to the same macro shocks? This paper decomposes the comovements of bank trading losses into two orthogonal channels: portfolio overlap and common shocks.