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Households report distinctive views of the macroeconomy along partisan lines, while their expectations about personal finances do not follow the same pattern. Economic inequality remains the major contributor to polarized views of the macroeconomy. Partisan politics are simply a magnifier.

Should unemployment benefits be more generous during economic downturns? The optimal amount and duration of benefit payments ultimately depend on the demographic and wealth characteristics of benefit recipients.

We study economies where firms acquire capital in primary markets then retrade it in secondary markets after information on idiosyncratic productivity arrives. Our secondary markets incorporate bilateral trade with search, bargaining and liquidity frictions.

We study the cross-section of equilibrium returns on safe assets using a tractable asset pricing model with a micro-founded demand for liquidity and multiple safe assets with heterogeneous transaction costs. We test the main predictions of our theory using a novel measure of relative (in)convenience yields in the US Treasury market.

This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, the unintended consequences of mandatory retention rules in securitization. It proposes a novel model showing that while retention strengthens monitoring, it may also encourage banks to shift risk.

We analyze monetary policy responses to AI in a two-sector New Keynesian model, distinguishing augmentation and automation. Both reduce labor demand, requiring accommodation that creates inflation trade-offs. Automation worsens them. Aggregate inflation depends on AI’s form and breadth, making policy stabilization more complex and aggregate data potentially misleading.

We investigate competition between two intrinsically worthless currencies as a result of decentralized interactions between human subjects. We design a laboratory experiment based on a simple two-country, two-currency search model to study factors that affect circulation patterns and equilibrium selection.

Foreign direct investment inflows are positively related to growth across developing countries—but so are savings in excess of investment. I develop an explanation for this well-established puzzle by focusing on the limited availability of consumer credit in developing countries together with general equilibrium effects.

This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming that players have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions.

This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and may deviate from the Friedman rule; (2) multiple equilibria may exist; (3) when the economy approaches a cashless state, the central bank’s optimal policy improves the market power of the e-money issuer and can lead to a discrete decrease in welfare and a discrete increase in inflation; and (4) first best cannot be achieved.