Toni Ahnert is a Research Advisor in the Financial Stability Department at the Bank of Canada. He is a financial economist with interests in financial intermediation theory and global games. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the London School of Economics and Political Science and is a member of the Finance Theory Group.
Third parties often assume default risk at loan origination in return for a fee. Insurance, various guarantees and external credit enhancements protect the owner of the loan against borrower default. Governments often assume such default risk through guarantees for various types of loans, including mortgages, student loans and small business loans.
After the financial crisis of 2007–09, many jurisdictions introduced new banking regulations to make banks more resilient and less likely to fail. These regulations included tighter limits for the quality and quantity of bank capital and introduced minimum standards for liquidity. But what was the impact of these changes?
Can macroprudential foreign exchange (FX) regulations on banks reduce the financial and macroeconomic vulnerabilities created by borrowing in foreign currency? To evaluate the effectiveness and unintended consequences of macroprudential FX regulations, we develop a parsimonious model of bank and market lending in domestic and foreign currency and derive four predictions.
We present a simple model to study the risk sensitivity of capital regulation. A banker funds investment with uninsured deposits and costly capital, where capital resolves a moral hazard problem in the banker’s choice of risk.
The scale of safe assets suggests a structural demand for a safe wealth share beyond transaction and liquidity roles. We study how investors achieve a reference wealth level by combining self-insurance and contingent liquidation of investment. Intermediaries improve upon autarky, insuring investors with poor self-insurance and limiting liquidation.