We create a theoretical model of central bank asset purchases. The model helps explain how, in a crisis, these purchases ease pressures on investment dealers.
We explore the idea that the financial sector can be a source of non-fundamental risk to the rest of the economy. We also consider whether policy can be used to reduce this risk—either by increasing the supply of publicly backed safe assets or by reducing the demand for safe assets.
This paper explores how the Canadian futures market contributed to banks’ systemic risk during the 2008 financial crisis. It finds that core banks as a whole traded against the periphery, in this way increasing their risk of simultaneous losses.
We document a new empirical finding in the foreign exchange market: currency returns show systematic reversals around the benchmark fixings. Specifically, the US dollar, on average, appreciates in the hours before fixes and depreciates after fixes.
“Reach for yield”—This is the commonly heard explanation for why pension plans shift their portfolios toward alternative assets. But we show that the new portfolios also hold more bonds, offer lower average returns and produce smaller and less volatile solvency deficits. These shifts are part of a broader strategy to reduce solvency risk.
How is the stability of the financial sector affected by competition in the deposit market and by decisions banks make about transparency? We find that policies that aim to increase bank competition lead to higher bank deposit rates, increasing both withdrawal incentives and instability.
We examine how the eight largest Canadian public pension funds managed liquidity during the market turmoil in March 2020. The funds were generally resilient to large demands for liquidity and relied heavily on Canada's core funding markets.
We offer relevant authorities a three-step assessment framework they can use to understand, identify and quantify the risks associated with stablecoin and other cryptocurrency arrangements.