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We consider two trade-offs inherent to extraordinary forward guidance (EFG): potency versus flexibility, and the credibility of forward guidance versus the credibility of inflation targeting. We argue that the form of EFG used by the Bank of Canada during the COVID‑19 pandemic balanced both trade-offs relatively well.

We explore how many electronic funds transfer (EFT) systems can viably coexist within a jurisdiction at efficient scale by estimating the cost curve of the average EFT. We estimate the marginal cost to be approximately $0.55 per transaction, and the fixed cost to be approximately $83 million per year.

Can artificial intelligence (AI) think and act like a cash manager? In this paper we explore how generative AI agents can help manage liquidity, prioritize payments and optimize efficiency in real-time gross settlement systems.

We study how participants in the Lynx payment system use the net send limit (NSL) tool to control their intraday payment outflow levels. Our results show that participants typically adopt a “set it and forget it” approach to scheduling NSLs and sometimes have distinct intraday NSL adjustment behaviours.

Central bankers argue that programmable digital currencies may compromise the uniformity of money. We develop a stylized model to examine this argument and the trade-offs involved in circulating programmable money.

We assess both the US and Canadian nominal neutral rates to be in the range of 2.25% to 3.25%, unchanged from the range assessed in 2024.

This paper analyzes the optimal quantity of central bank reserves in an economy where reserves and other financial assets provide liquidity benefits. Using a static model, I derive a constrained Friedman rule that characterizes the socially optimal level of reserves, demonstrating that this quantity is neither necessarily large nor small but depends on the marginal benefits of reserves relative to alternative safe assets.

We consider ways central banks could adapt in the event of an increased risk of a dash for cash from asset managers. We explore ideas such as new facilities that ease asset managers’ ability to convert existing assets to cash or new assets with liquidity that central banks would guarantee.

We consider ways central banks could adapt in the event of an increased risk of a dash for cash from asset managers. We explore ideas such as new facilities that ease asset managers’ ability to convert existing assets to cash or new assets with liquidity that central banks would guarantee.

In 2024, the Bank of Canada reviewed and updated its Contingent Term Repo Facility policy, incorporating lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic and other global market developments, such as the UK gilt crisis in September 2022. This paper accompanies the March 17, 2025, Contingent Term Repo Facility market notice and provides background information and further details about the design of the revised policy.