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103 Results

Liquidity Efficiency and Distribution in the LVTS: Non-Neutrality of System Changes under Network Asymmetry

Staff Discussion Paper 2008-11 Sean O'Connor, James Chapman, Kirby Millar
The authors consider the liquidity efficiency of Tranche 2 of the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS T2) by examining, through an empirical analysis, some plausible strategic reactions of individual participants to a systemwide shock to available liquidity in the system.

A Note on Contestability in the Canadian Banking Industry

Staff Discussion Paper 2007-7 Jason Allen, Ying Liu
The authors examine the degree of contestability in the Canadian banking system using the H-statistic proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) and modified by Bikker, Spierdijk, and Finnie (2006). A modification is necessary because the standard approach of controlling for size using total assets leads to an upward bias in the H-statistic. The authors propose […]
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, L, L1, L11

Micro Foundations of Price-Setting Behaviour: Evidence from Canadian Firms

Staff Working Paper 2007-31 Daniel de Munnik, Kuan Xu
How do firms adjust prices in the marketplace? Do they tend to adjust prices infrequently in response to changes in market conditions? If so, why? These remain key questions in macroeconomics, particularly for central banks that work to keep inflation low and stable.

Credit in a Tiered Payments System

Staff Working Paper 2006-36 Alexandra Lai, Nikil Chande, Sean O'Connor
Payments systems are typically characterized by some degree of tiering, with upstream firms (clearing agents) providing settlement accounts to downstream institutions that wish to clear and settle payments indirectly in these systems (indirect clearers).

Ownership Concentration and Competition in Banking Markets

Staff Working Paper 2006-7 Alexandra Lai, Raphael Solomon
Many countries prohibit large shareholdings in their domestic banks.The authors examine whether such a restriction restrains competition in a duopolistic loan market. Blockholders may influence managers' output decisions by choosing capital structure, as in Brander and Lewis (1986).

Competition in Banking: A Review of the Literature

Staff Working Paper 2004-24 Carol Ann Northcott
The author reviews the theoretical and empirical literature to examine the traditional perception that the following trade-off exists between economic efficiency and stability in the banking system: a competitive banking system is more efficient and therefore important to growth, but market power is necessary for stability in the banking system.
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