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The current monetary policy framework of the Fed intends to be more ’inclusive’ by running the economy hot for longer during expansions.

We study optimal monetary policy in an analytically tractable Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian model. In the model, the central bank has an incentive to reduce consumption inequality in addition to keeping economic activity at its efficient level and inflation stable.

Specifications of the Federal Reserve target rate that have more realistic features mitigate in-sample over-fitting and are favored in the data.

For central banks, conducting policy in an environment of uncertainty is a daily fact of life. This uncertainty can take many forms, ranging from incomplete knowledge of the correct economic model and data to future economic and geopolitical events whose precise magnitudes and effects cannot be known with certainty.

Business cycles are substantially correlated across countries. Yet most existing models are not able to generate substantial transmission through international trade. We show that the nature of such transmission depends fundamentally on the features determining the responsiveness of labor supply and labor demand to international relative prices.

This paper examines inefficiencies arising from a lack of long-term contracting in small business lending in China.

This paper quantifies the contribution of sector-specific supply and demand shocks to personal consumption expenditure (PCE) inflation. It derives identification restrictions that are consistent with a large class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with production networks.

Using the quantum Monte Carlo algorithm, we study whether quantum computing can improve the run time of economic applications and challenges in doing so. We apply the algorithm to two models: a stress testing bank model and a DSGE model solved with deep learning. We also present innovations in the algorithm and benchmark it to classical Monte Carlo.

Optimal coordination of monetary and macroprudential policies implies higher risk weights on (safe) bonds any time that banks are required to hold additional capital buffers. Coordination also implies a somewhat tighter monetary-policy stance whenever such capital buffers are released.

Financial sector bailouts, while potentially beneficial during a crisis, might lead to excessive risk taking if anticipated. Taking expectations and aggregate risk implications into account, we show that bailouts can be welfare improving, but only if capital adequacy constraints are sufficiently tight.