Vertical Bargaining and Obfuscation Staff Working Paper 2022-13 Edona Reshidi Is obscuring prices always bad for consumers? The answer depends on the market structure and on the negotiating power between manufacturers and retailers. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): C, C7, C70, L, L1, L13, L4, L42
Trade and Market Power in Product and Labor Markets Staff Working Paper 2021-17 Gaelan MacKenzie Trade liberalizations increase the sales and input purchases of productive firms relative to their less productive domestic competitors. This reallocation affects firms’ market power in their product and input markets. I quantify how the labour market power of employers affects the distribution and size of the gains from trade. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Labour markets, Market structure and pricing, Productivity, Trade integration JEL Code(s): D, D4, D43, F, F1, F12, F6, J, L, L1, L13
Imperfect Banking Competition and Macroeconomic Volatility: A DSGE Framework Staff Working Paper 2021-12 Jiaqi Li How do banks adjust their loan rate markup in response to macroeconomic shocks? Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Financial institutions, Interest rates JEL Code(s): E, E3, E32, E4, E44, G, G2, G21, L, L1, L13
Explaining the Interplay Between Merchant Acceptance and Consumer Adoption in Two-Sided Markets for Payment Methods Staff Working Paper 2019-32 Kim Huynh, Gradon Nicholls, Oleksandr Shcherbakov Recent consumer and merchant surveys show a decrease in the use of cash at the point of sale. Increasingly, consumers and merchants have access to a growing array of payment innovations as substitutes for cash. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Econometric and statistical methods, Financial services JEL Code(s): C, C5, C51, L, L1, L13, L15, L8, L81, L9, L96
Inference in Games Without Nash Equilibrium: An Application to Restaurants’ Competition in Opening Hours Staff Working Paper 2018-60 Erhao Xie This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming that players have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): C, C5, C57, L, L1, L13, L8, L85
Information Sharing and Bargaining in Buyer-Seller Networks Staff Working Paper 2016-63 Sofia Priazhkina, Frank H. Page This paper presents a model of strategic buyer-seller networks with information exchange between sellers. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers can share access to buyers for a negotiated transfer. We study how this information exchange affects overall market prices, volumes and welfare, given different initial market conditions and information sharing rules. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Firm dynamics, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): C, C7, C71, C78, D, D2, D21, D4, D43, D8, D85, L, L1, L13
Bank Screening Heterogeneity Staff Working Paper 2016-56 Thibaut Duprey Production efficiency and financial stability do not necessarily go hand in hand. With heterogeneity in banks’ abilities to screen borrowers, the market for loans becomes segmented and a self-competition mechanism arises. When heterogeneity increases, the intensive and extensive margins have opposite effects. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G1, G14, G2, G21, L, L1, L13
November 14, 2013 Fragmentation in Canadian Equity Markets Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2013 Corey Garriott, Anna Pomeranets, Joshua Slive, Thomas Thorn Changes in technology and regulation have resulted in an increasing number of trading venues in equity markets in Canada. New trading platforms have intensified price competition and have encouraged innovation, and they do not appear to have segmented trade. But the increasingly complex market structure has necessitated investments in expensive technology and has introduced new operational risks. Regulatory responses should be carefully adapted to retain the competition and innovation associated with this market fragmentation. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G2, L, L1, L13, N, N2, N22
November 15, 2012 Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2012 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Héctor Pérez Saiz, Joshua Slive Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G1, G18, G2, G21, L, L1, L13
Building New Plants or Entering by Acquisition? Estimation of an Entry Model for the U.S. Cement Industry Staff Working Paper 2011-1 Héctor Pérez Saiz In many industries, firms usually have two choices when expanding into new markets: They can either build a new plant (greenfield entry) or they can acquire an existing incumbent. In the U.S. cement industry, the comparative advantage (e.g., TFP or size) of entrants versus incumbents and regulatory entry barriers are important factors that determine the means of expansion. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Market structure and pricing, Productivity JEL Code(s): L, L1, L13, L4, L40, L6, L61