Security and convenience of a central bank digital currency Staff analytical note 2020-21 Charles M. Kahn, Francisco Rivadeneyra An anonymous token-based central bank digital currency (CBDC) would pose certain security risks to users. These risks arise from how balances are aggregated, from their transactional use and from the competition between suppliers of aggregation solutions. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, G, G2, G21 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial system regulation and oversight, Money and payments, Digital assets and fintech, Payment and financial market infrastructures
Trading for Bailouts Staff working paper 2020-23 Toni Ahnert, Caio Machado, Ana Elisa Pereira In times of high uncertainty, governments often implement interventions such as bailouts to financial institutions. To use public resources efficiently and to avoid major spillovers to the rest of the economy, policy-makers try to identify which institutions should receive assistance. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): D, D8, D83, G, G1, G12, G14, G18 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight
Optimal Taxation in Asset Markets with Adverse Selection Staff working paper 2020-11 Mohammad Davoodalhosseini What is the optimal tax schedule in over-the-counter markets, e.g., those for corporate bonds? I find that an optimal tax schedule is often non-monotonic. For example, trading of some high-price assets should be subsidized, and trading of some low-price assets should be taxed. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D83, E, E2, E24, G, G1, G10, J, J3, J31, J6, J64 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market structure, Financial system, Financial system regulation and oversight
Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design Staff working paper 2019-30 Jason Allen, Robert Clark, Brent Hickman, Eric Richert Bank resolution is costly. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) typically resolves failing banks by auction. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): C, C5, C57, D, D4, D44, G, G2, G21 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market structure, Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight
Flight from Safety: How a Change to the Deposit Insurance Limit Affects Households’ Portfolio Allocation Staff working paper 2019-29 H. Evren Damar, Reint Gropp, Adi Mordel Deposit insurance protects depositors from failing banks, thus making insured deposits risk-free. When a deposit insurance limit is increased, some deposits that previously were uninsured become insured, thereby increasing the share of risk-free assets in households’ portfolios. This increase cannot simply be undone by households, because to invest in uninsured deposits, a household must first invest in insured deposits up to the limit. This basic insight is the starting point of the analysis in this paper. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): D, D1, D14, G, G2, G21, G28, L, L5, L51 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial system regulation and oversight, Household and business credit
Macroprudential Policy with Capital Buffers Staff working paper 2019-8 Josef Schroth The countercyclical capital buffer is part of Basel III, the set of regulatory measures developed in response to the financial crisis of 2007–09. This study focuses on how time-varying capital buffers can address inefficiencies in economies with endogenous financial crises. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): E, E1, E13, E3, E32, E4, E44 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight, Household and business credit
Macroprudential FX Regulations: Shifting the Snowbanks of FX Vulnerability? Staff working paper 2018-55 Toni Ahnert, Kristin Forbes, Christian Friedrich, Dennis Reinhardt Can macroprudential foreign exchange (FX) regulations on banks reduce the financial and macroeconomic vulnerabilities created by borrowing in foreign currency? To evaluate the effectiveness and unintended consequences of macroprudential FX regulations, we develop a parsimonious model of bank and market lending in domestic and foreign currency and derive four predictions. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): F, F3, F32, F34, G, G1, G15, G2, G21, G28 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, International markets and currencies, Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight
The Impact of Recent Policy Changes on the Canadian Mortgage Market Staff analytical note 2018-35 Olga Bilyk, Maria teNyenhuis Recent policy changes are having a clear impact on the mortgage market. The number of new, highly indebted borrowers has fallen, and overall mortgage activity has slowed significantly. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): D, D1, E, E4, G, G2, G21, G28 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial system regulation and oversight, Household and business credit
Calibrating the Magnitude of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer Using Market-Based Stress Tests Staff working paper 2018-54 Maarten van Oordt How much capital do banks need as a buffer to absorb severe shocks? By using historical stock market data, market-based stress tests help estimate the magnitude of capital buffers necessary to absorb severe but plausible shocks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G2, G21, G28 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight
Should Bank Capital Regulation Be Risk Sensitive? Staff working paper 2018-48 Toni Ahnert, James Chapman, Carolyn A. Wilkins We present a simple model to study the risk sensitivity of capital regulation. A banker funds investment with uninsured deposits and costly capital, where capital resolves a moral hazard problem in the banker’s choice of risk. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G28 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight