Staff research

This paper studies how a central bank should design a CBDC when private payment providers collect and monetize transaction data. It characterizes the optimal CBDC’s pricing and data policy, and shows how its effects on private payment use and total data depend on market power and data externalities.

This policy note examines how a non-interest-bearing retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) could affect the financial stability of Canada’s systemically important banks during a severe recession. Stress test results show that the banks remain resilient, maintaining key regulatory ratios even under high CBDC demand.

This paper develops a general equilibrium model to assess central bank digital currency (CBDC) design in a monetary system where traditional banks and “crypto banks” (i.e., banks that issue stablecoins) coexist. We compare tokenized and non-tokenized CBDC, showing that their desirability depends on the reliability of private money provision, the availability of collateral assets and the features of the crypto sector.

We study the competition between a welfare-maximizing public payment platform (e.g., CBDC or fast payment system) and a profit-maximizing private platform in a two-sided market, deriving optimal public pricing and showing how network effects, fragmentation, and policy mandates like zero fees or cost recovery shape welfare, usage, and fee incidence.

Previous research suggests that lower-income Canadians may have unique experiences with the use of payments, including the use of cash and digital payments. We conduct a case study using data from [the Canadian Financial Diaries project/Canadian financial diaries] to gain insight into how some lower-income Canadians pay.

We study consumer cash inventory behavior by developing a dynamic model of forward-looking consumers and estimating structural parameters of the model using detailed consumer survey data. Consumers facing holding and withdrawal costs solve a discrete-time continuous-control dynamic programming problem to optimally use cash at the point of sale.

Central bankers argue that programmable digital currencies may compromise the uniformity of money. We develop a stylized model to examine this argument and the trade-offs involved in circulating programmable money.

We outline possible system architectures for an online retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) and identify one well-suited for basic payments. We analyze OpenCBDC 2PC, a representative system, finding such designs to be feasible, although some areas require further investigation. Our framing highlights other promising architectures for a retail CBDC.

This paper analyzes the optimal quantity of central bank reserves in an economy where reserves and other financial assets provide liquidity benefits. Using a static model, I derive a constrained Friedman rule that characterizes the socially optimal level of reserves, demonstrating that this quantity is neither necessarily large nor small but depends on the marginal benefits of reserves relative to alternative safe assets.

The Bitcoin Omnibus Survey is an important tool for monitoring Canadians’ awareness and ownership of bitcoin and other cryptoassets over time. In this paper, we present data highlights from the 2023 survey.