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This paper studies how a central bank should design a CBDC when private payment providers collect and monetize transaction data. It characterizes the optimal CBDC’s pricing and data policy, and shows how its effects on private payment use and total data depend on market power and data externalities.

We study access to Canadian retail banking and cash services in rural, localized markets using the Bresnahan-Reiss entry threshold framework. We find that the first retail banking services branch entry requires about 500 residents in an average market, whereas the first cash services location requires about 80 residents.

In markets with costly buyer entry, information transparency about prices draws in buyers, increasing demand-side competition and putting upward pressure on prices. We show that this buyer entry effect may dominate seller competition as emphasized by conventional wisdom and prices and markups may rise with information transparency.

Exporters frequently change their market destinations. This paper introduces a new approach to identifying the drivers of these decisions over time. Analysis of customs data from China and the UK shows most changes are driven by demand rather than supply-related shocks.

Market power and pass-through of cost and demand shocks are studied in a market with free entry of heterogeneous firms and consumer mixed search. Equilibrium prices and markups are driven by variation in the elasticity of demand across firms. Improved conditions for buyers can either raise or lower market power.

We model non-bank entry into fixed-income markets and state-dependent liquidity. Non-bank financial institutions improve liquidity more during normal times than in stress. Banks may become less reliable to marginal clients, exacerbating the difference in liquidity between normal and stressed times. Central bank lending during stress may limit this harmful division.

We simulate introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) and consider consumer adoption, merchant acceptance and usage at the point of sale. Modest adoption frictions significantly inhibit CBDC market penetration along all three dimensions. Incumbent responses to restore pre-CBDC market shares are moderate to small and further reduce the impact of a CBDC.

We simulate the impact of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) on consumer adoption, merchant acceptance and use of different payment methods. Modest frictions that deter consumer adoption of a CBDC inhibit its market penetration. Minor pricing responses by financial institutions and payment service providers further reduce the impact of a CBDC.

We develop and estimate a search model in which identical consumers trade with price-setting firms that differ in productivity. We use the estimated model to characterize the qualitative and quantitative differences in prices and markups across firms. We explore how individual firms respond to changes in cost and demand and how they pass these through to their prices and markup.

We study how the distribution of information supply by the news media affects the macroeconomy. We find that media coverage focuses particularly on the largest firms, and that firms’ equity financing and investment increase after media coverage. But these equity and investment responses are largest among small, rarely covered firms. Our quantitative studies highlight that the aggregate effects of media coverage depend crucially on how that coverage is allocated.