November 14, 2013 Fragmentation in Canadian Equity Markets Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2013 Corey Garriott, Anna Pomeranets, Joshua Slive, Thomas Thorn Changes in technology and regulation have resulted in an increasing number of trading venues in equity markets in Canada. New trading platforms have intensified price competition and have encouraged innovation, and they do not appear to have segmented trade. But the increasingly complex market structure has necessitated investments in expensive technology and has introduced new operational risks. Regulatory responses should be carefully adapted to retain the competition and innovation associated with this market fragmentation. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G2, L, L1, L13, N, N2, N22
November 15, 2012 Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2012 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Héctor Pérez Saiz, Joshua Slive Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G1, G18, G2, G21, L, L1, L13
Building New Plants or Entering by Acquisition? Estimation of an Entry Model for the U.S. Cement Industry Staff Working Paper 2011-1 Héctor Pérez Saiz In many industries, firms usually have two choices when expanding into new markets: They can either build a new plant (greenfield entry) or they can acquire an existing incumbent. In the U.S. cement industry, the comparative advantage (e.g., TFP or size) of entrants versus incumbents and regulatory entry barriers are important factors that determine the means of expansion. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Market structure and pricing, Productivity JEL Code(s): L, L1, L13, L4, L40, L6, L61
Cross-border Mergers and Hollowing-out Staff Working Paper 2009-30 Oana Secrieru, Marianne Vigneault The purpose of our paper is to examine the profitability and social desirability of both domestic and foreign mergers in a location-quantity competition model, where we allow for the possibility of hollowing-out of the target firm. We refer to hollowing-out as the situation where the target firm is shut down following a merger with a domestic or foreign acquirer. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, International topics, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D43, G, G3, G34, L, L1, L13, L4, L41
What To Do about Bilateral Credit Limits in the LVTS When a Closure Is Anticipated: Risk versus Liquidity Sharing among LVTS Participants Staff Discussion Paper 2008-13 Sean O'Connor, Greg Caldwell The authors examine the effect of a trade-off between shared credit risk and liquidity efficiency, among participants in Tranche 2 of the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS T2), on their decisions to leave open, or close, their bilateral credit limits (BCLs) to a participant at risk of imminent closure. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, L, L1, L13, L14
Liquidity Efficiency and Distribution in the LVTS: Non-Neutrality of System Changes under Network Asymmetry Staff Discussion Paper 2008-11 Sean O'Connor, James Chapman, Kirby Millar The authors consider the liquidity efficiency of Tranche 2 of the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS T2) by examining, through an empirical analysis, some plausible strategic reactions of individual participants to a systemwide shock to available liquidity in the system. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, L, L1, L13, L14
Credit in a Tiered Payments System Staff Working Paper 2006-36 Alexandra Lai, Nikil Chande, Sean O'Connor Payments systems are typically characterized by some degree of tiering, with upstream firms (clearing agents) providing settlement accounts to downstream institutions that wish to clear and settle payments indirectly in these systems (indirect clearers). Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Market structure and pricing, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, L, L1, L12, L13, L2, L22
Competition in Banking: A Review of the Literature Staff Working Paper 2004-24 Carol Ann Northcott The author reviews the theoretical and empirical literature to examine the traditional perception that the following trade-off exists between economic efficiency and stability in the banking system: a competitive banking system is more efficient and therefore important to growth, but market power is necessary for stability in the banking system. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G28, L, L1, L11, L12, L13, L16