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In 2024, the Bank of Canada reviewed and updated its Contingent Term Repo Facility policy, incorporating lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic and other global market developments, such as the UK gilt crisis in September 2022. This paper accompanies the March 17, 2025, Contingent Term Repo Facility market notice and provides background information and further details about the design of the revised policy.

The Bank of Canada completed its first resolution plan for the Canadian Derivatives and Clearing Corporation (CDCC) in 2024. To estimate the resolution costs, we apply the extreme value theory method to simulate the credit losses that would result from extreme scenarios where multiple clearing members default at the same time.

Can regulators keep pace with banks’ creative regulatory workarounds? Our analysis unpacks the trade-offs between fixed regulations and crisis-triggered rules, showing that the latter are especially prone to circumvention—and can trigger larger, costlier bailouts.

The Canadian Collateral Management Service (CCMS) is a new tri-party collateral management service offered by the TMX Group and Clearstream. CCMS will enhance Canada’s financial infrastructure for securities financing transactions, including for the repurchase, or repo, market that is a core funding market in Canada. We explain the importance of the repo market and describe the benefits of the CCMS for market participants and for the Bank of Canada.

We introduce a history of macroprudential policy (MPP) events in Canada since the 1980s. We document the short-run effects of MPP announcements on market-based measures of systemic risk and find that MPPs can influence the market’s perception of large banks’ resilience.

We model non-bank entry into fixed-income markets and state-dependent liquidity. Non-bank financial institutions improve liquidity more during normal times than in stress. Banks may become less reliable to marginal clients, exacerbating the difference in liquidity between normal and stressed times. Central bank lending during stress may limit this harmful division.

In 2023, the share of Canadian banks’ foreign assets and liabilities amounted to around 50%. While Canadian banks engage domestically mostly with households and non-financial corporations, their most common counterparties abroad are non-bank financial institutions.

The Bank of Canada is using an enhanced dataset that tracks the stock of outstanding mortgages and home equity lines of credit held by federally regulated lenders. This paper highlights some of the new details in the dataset and how they impact the Bank’s understanding of the mortgage market.

We draw on the Canadian experience to examine how monetary and macroprudential policies interact and possibly complement each other in achieving their respective price and financial stability objectives.

We find that foreign central banks own a large share of Government of Canada (GoC) bonds and tend to hold their positions for longer than other types of asset managers. This buy-and-hold behaviour could offer benefits. For example, foreign central banks may be less likely than other asset managers to sell bonds and add to strains on market liquidity in periods of turmoil. However, foreign central banks’ buy-and-hold behaviour combined with their minimal lending of GoC bonds in securities-financing markets, as observed in our available data, can potentially lower liquidity because fewer GoC bonds are available for others to transact in secondary markets. Indeed, we find that higher levels of foreign central banks’ GoC bond holdings are related to lower liquidity.