Optimal Margining and Margin Relief in Centrally Cleared Derivatives Markets Staff Working Paper 2014-29 Radoslav Raykov A major policy challenge posed by derivatives clearinghouses is that their collateral requirements can rise sharply in times of stress, reducing market liquidity and further exacerbating downturns. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G1, G19, G2, G21
Improving Overnight Loan Identification in Payments Systems Staff Working Paper 2014-25 Mark Rempel Information on the allocation and pricing of over-the-counter (OTC) markets is scarce. Furfine (1999) pioneered an algorithm that provides transaction-level data on the OTC interbank lending market. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial markets, Interest rates, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C3, C38, C5, C53, E, E4, E42, E44, G, G1, G10
May 13, 2014 Understanding Platform-Based Digital Currencies Bank of Canada Review - Spring 2014 Ben Fung, Hanna Halaburda Given technological advances and the widespread use of the Internet, various digital currencies have emerged. In most cases, Internet platforms such as Facebook and Amazon restrict the functionality of their digital currencies to enhance the business model and maximize their profits. While platform-based digital currencies could increase the efficiency of retail payments, they could also raise some important policy issues if they were to become widely used outside of the platform. Thus, it is important to closely monitor the evolution of these digital currencies. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Financial services, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E41, E42
E-Money: Efficiency, Stability and Optimal Policy Staff Working Paper 2014-16 Jonathan Chiu, Tsz-Nga Wong What makes e-money more special than cash? Is the introduction of e-money necessarily welfare enhancing? Is an e-money system necessarily stable? What is the optimal way to design an efficient and stable e-money scheme? Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, E5, E58, L, L5, L51
Electronic Money and Payments: Recent Developments and Issues Staff Discussion Paper 2014-2 Ben Fung, Miguel Molico, Gerald Stuber The authors review recent developments in retail payments in Canada and elsewhere, with a focus on e-money products, and assess their potential public policy implications. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Financial services, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E41, E42
Some Economics of Private Digital Currency Staff Working Paper 2013-38 Joshua S. Gans, Hanna Halaburda This paper reviews some recent developments in digital currency, focusing on platform-sponsored currencies such as Facebook Credits. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Economic models, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): D, D4, D42, E, E4, L, L5, L51
To Link or Not To Link? Netting and Exposures Between Central Counterparties Staff Working Paper 2013-6 Stacey Anderson, Jean-Philippe Dion, Héctor Pérez Saiz This paper provides a framework to compare linked and unlinked CCP configurations in terms of total netting achieved by market participants and the total system default exposures that exist between participants and CCPs. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G1, G18, G2, G23
On the Welfare Effects of Credit Arrangements Staff Working Paper 2012-43 Jonathan Chiu, Mei Dong, Enchuan Shao This paper studies the welfare effects of different credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, a deviation from the Friedman rule is always sub-optimal. Moreover, credit arrangements can be welfare-reducing, because increased consumption by credit users will drive up the price level so that money users have to reduce consumption when facing a binding liquidity restraint. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credit and credit aggregates, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E40, E5, E50
November 15, 2012 The Changing Landscape for Retail Payments in Canada and the Implications for the Demand for Cash Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2012 Carlos Arango, Kim Huynh, Ben Fung, Gerald Stuber Over the past 20 years, there has been a major shift away from the use of paper-based retail payment instruments, such as cash and cheques, toward electronic means of payment, such as debit cards and credit cards. Recent Bank of Canada research on consumers’ choice of payment instruments indicates that cash is frequently used for transactions with low values because of its speed, ease of use and wide acceptance, while debit and credit cards are more commonly used for transactions with higher values because of perceived attributes such as safety and record keeping. While innovations in retail payments currently being introduced into the Canadian marketplace could lead to a further reduction in the use of cash over the longer term, the implications for the use of cash of some of the structural and regulatory developments under way are less clear. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Bank notes, Econometric and statistical methods, Financial system regulation and policies, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C8, C83, E, E4, E42, G, G2, G28
Efficiency and Bargaining Power in the Interbank Loan Market Staff Working Paper 2012-29 Jason Allen, James Chapman, Federico Echenique, Matthew Shum Using detailed loan transactions-level data we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market, and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no-arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C7, C71, E, E5, E58, G, G2, G21, G28