We study the impact of the Bank of Canada’s choice of settlement mechanism in Lynx on participant behaviors, liquidity usage, payment delays and the overall operational efficiency of the new system.
Staff discussion papers
As part of modernizing its core payments infrastructure, Canada will replace the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) with a new Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system called Lynx. An important question for policy-makers is how Lynx should be designed.
The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) loss-sharing mechanism was designed to ensure that, in the event of a one-participant default, the collateral pledged by direct members of the system would be sufficient to cover the largest possible net debit position of a defaulting participant. However, the situation may not hold if the indirect effects of the defaults are taken into consideration, or if two participants default during the same payment cycle.
Staff working papers
This paper uncovers trends in payment timing in Canada’s Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) from 2003 to 2011. Descriptive analysis shows that LVTS payment activity has not been peaking in the late afternoon since 2008, and the improvement was most significant in 2009.
This paper applies a static model of an interest rate corridor to the Canadian data, and estimates the aggregate demand for central-bank settlement balances in the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS).