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This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, the unintended consequences of mandatory retention rules in securitization. It proposes a novel model showing that while retention strengthens monitoring, it may also encourage banks to shift risk.

This paper explains the nature of interest rates in the U.S. federal funds market after the 2007-09 financial crisis. We build a model of the over-the-counter lending market that incorporates new aspects of the financial system: abundance of liquidity, different regulatory standards for banks, and arbitrage opportunities created by limited access to the facility granting interest on excess reserves.

The COVID-19 pandemic uncovered policy challenges related to the economic measures that were taken to support the economy. Two years later, we attempt to identify the broader impact of these measures and research that needs to follow.

We develop a principal-agent model of cyber-attacking with fee-paying clients who delegate security decisions to financial platforms. We derive testable implications about clients’ vulnerability to cyber attacks and about the fees charged.

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of macroprudential policies when regulations are uneven across mortgage lender types. We look at credit tightening that results from macroprudential regulations and examine how much of it is counteracted by credit shifting to unregulated lenders. We also study the impact of monetary policy tightening when some lenders are unregulated.

Bank regulation presumes risks spill over more easily from large banks to the banking system than vice versa. Interestingly, we observe this is not the case. We find that the capacity to transmit risk is larger in the system-to-bank direction, leading to an increased default risk.

We examine the impact of the CCyB on foreign lending activities of Canadian banks. We show that the announcement of a tightening in another country’s CCyB leads to a decrease in the growth rate of cross-border lending between Canadian banks and borrowers in that other country.

We offer a theory of how inefficiently lax financial regulation could arise in a democratic society.

Financial sector bailouts, while potentially beneficial during a crisis, might lead to excessive risk taking if anticipated. Taking expectations and aggregate risk implications into account, we show that bailouts can be welfare improving, but only if capital adequacy constraints are sufficiently tight.

How is the stability of the financial sector affected by competition in the deposit market and by decisions banks make about transparency? We find that policies that aim to increase bank competition lead to higher bank deposit rates, increasing both withdrawal incentives and instability.