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239 Results

June 12, 2014

Reforming Financial Benchmarks: An International Perspective

Thomas Thorn and Harri Vikstedt examine the efforts being taken internationally and in Canada to enhance the governance and integrity of financial benchmarks. The report provides an overview of how interbank interest rate benchmarks are set and describes the weaknesses in the process that were exposed by the financial crisis. It also explains recent policy developments designed to make global and Canadian interbank benchmarks more robust.
June 12, 2014

Making Banks Safer: Implementing Basel III

Éric Chouinard and Graydon Paulin review the progress to date in implementing Basel III, the new framework of global regulatory standards for the banking sector developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The report highlights the expected net benefits of implementing Basel III, as well as the challenges in ensuring international consistency in measuring the risk-weighted capital of banks. It includes a discussion on how implementing Basel III has affected the banking system in Canada and other important jurisdictions, and demonstrates the need for ongoing assessment of the effects on the financial system and the macroeconomy.

A Policy Model to Analyze Macroprudential Regulations and Monetary Policy

Staff Working Paper 2014-6 Sami Alpanda, Gino Cateau, Césaire Meh
We construct a small-open-economy, New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model with real-financial linkages to analyze the effects of financial shocks and macroprudential policies on the Canadian economy. Our model has four key features.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Economic models, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E1, E17, E3, E32, E4, E44, F, F4, F41

The ‘Celtic Crisis’: Guarantees, Transparency and Systemic Liquidity Risk

Staff Working Paper 2013-31 Philipp König, Kartik Anand, Frank Heinemann
Bank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to shore up investor confidence and prevent bank runs. However, as the experiences of some European countries, most notably Ireland, have demonstrated, the credibility and effectiveness of these guarantees are crucially intertwined with the sovereign’s funding risks.

Why Do Emerging Markets Liberalize Capital Outflow Controls? Fiscal versus Net Capital Flow Concerns

Staff Working Paper 2013-21 Joshua Aizenman, Gurnain Pasricha
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the factors that motivated emerging economies to change their capital outflow controls in recent decades. Liberalization of capital outflow controls can allow emerging-market economies (EMEs) to reduce net capital inflow (NKI) pressures, but may cost their governments the fiscal revenues that external financial repression generates.
February 21, 2013

Conference Summary: Financial Intermediation and Vulnerabilities

The Bank of Canada’s annual economic conference, held in October 2012, brought together experts from across Canada and around the world to discuss key issues concerning financial intermediation and vulnerabilities. The conference covered such topics as household finances and their relationship to financial stability, as well as bank regulation, securitization and shadow banking.

Real-financial Linkages through Loan Default and Bank Capital

Staff Working Paper 2013-3 Tamon Takamura
Many studies in macroeconomics argue that financial frictions do not amplify the impacts of real shocks. This finding is based on models without endogenous default on loans and bank capital. Using a model featuring endogenous interactions between firm default and bank capital, this paper revisits the propagation mechanisms of real and financial shocks.

Financial Crisis Resolution

Staff Working Paper 2012-42 Josef Schroth
This paper studies a dynamic version of the Holmstrom-Tirole model of intermediated finance. I show that competitive equilibria are not constrained efficient when the economy experiences a financial crisis. A pecuniary externality entails that banks’ desire to accumulate capital over time aggravates the scarcity of informed capital during the financial crisis.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): D, D5, D53, E, E6, E60, G, G0, G01, G1, G10, G18
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