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The analysis and forecasting of developments in the U.S. economy have always played a critical role in the formulation of Canadian economic and financial policy. Thus, the Bank places considerable importance on generating internal forecasts of U.S. economic activity as an input to the Canadian projection.

This paper proposes a Markov-switching framework to endogenously identify the following: (1) regimes where economies synchronously enter recessionary and expansionary phases; and (2) regimes where economies are unsynchronized, essentially following independent business cycles.

Since 2009, the G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth has provided a mechanism for international macroeconomic policy coordination. The Framework has had some successes, including agreement on objectives for fiscal consolidation. However, post-crisis global growth has been neither strong nor balanced. Progress has also been slow in developing credible fiscal consolidation plans in some advanced countries and in increasing exchange rate flexibility in certain emerging economies. A stronger peer review process and enhanced analysis of international spillovers would increase the Framework’s influence on member policies.

We study optimal monetary policy in an analytically tractable Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian model. In the model, the central bank has an incentive to reduce consumption inequality in addition to keeping economic activity at its efficient level and inflation stable.

In the United States prior to 1863 each bank issued its own distinct notes. E-money shares many of the characteristics of these bank notes. This paper describes some lessons relevant to e-money from the U.S. experience with state bank notes.

Over the past 10 years, financial firms have increased the size of their positions in the oil futures market. At the same time, oil prices have increased dramatically.

Deputy Governor Lawrence Schembri speaks before the Economics Society of Northern Alberta (ESNA).

Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker.

This article examines the incentives for banks to hold various assets on their balance sheets for use as collateral when the opportunity cost of doing so can be high. Focusing on the five-year period (2002-07) that preceded the financial crisis, it examines the choices made by financial institutions among the assets that are pledged as collateral in Canada's Large Value Transfer System. This serves as a baseline for collateral-management practices during relatively normal times. The results of this study are important for policy-makers, especially the Bank of Canada, which is concerned both about the efficient functioning of fixed-income markets and about the credit risk it ultimately bears in insuring LVTS settlement. The results suggest that relative market liquidity and market-making capacity are important factors in the choice of securities pledged as collateral in the LVTS.