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81 Results

January 30, 2005

Annual Report 2004

The Bank of Canada has played an integral role in Canadian society for 70 years. When the Bank opened its doors in the spring of 1935, this country was struggling to define itself and to survive the economic and social turmoil of the Great Depression. Like Canada’s economy, its central bank has evolved and grown over the years. It has faced critical challenges and embraced change. But the Bank’s mandate has not changed. It is now, as it was then, to provide an effective, national monetary authority for Canada.
Content Type(s): Publications, Annual Report

Macroprudential Regulation and Systemic Capital Requirements

Staff Working Paper 2010-4 Céline Gauthier, Alfred Lehar, Moez Souissi
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, there is interest in reforming bank regulation such that capital requirements are more closely linked to a bank's contribution to the overall risk of the financial system. In our paper we compare alternative mechanisms for allocating the overall risk of a banking system to its member banks.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial stability JEL Code(s): C, C1, C15, C8, C81, E, E4, E44, G, G2, G21

What to Expect When China Liberalizes Its Capital Account

Staff Discussion Paper 2016-10 Mark Kruger, Gurnain Pasricha
When China joined the World Trade Organization in December 2001, it marked a watershed for the world economy. Ten years from now, the opening of China’s capital account and the financial integration that will unfold will be viewed as a milestone of similar importance.

Inference in Games Without Nash Equilibrium: An Application to Restaurants’ Competition in Opening Hours

Staff Working Paper 2018-60 Erhao Xie
This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming that players have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions.
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