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Combining various high frequency financial data with central bank projections, I construct a new measure of monetary policy shocks not predictable by the public information preceding a central bank’s announcements. I then study the causal effects of monetary policy on the macro economy.

We examine how the eight largest Canadian public pension funds managed liquidity during the market turmoil in March 2020. The funds were generally resilient to large demands for liquidity and relied heavily on Canada's core funding markets.

We offer relevant authorities a three-step assessment framework they can use to understand, identify and quantify the risks associated with stablecoin and other cryptocurrency arrangements.

The Canadian non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI) sector saw strong growth in 2018 and 2019. In 2020, COVID‑19 caused a financial shock. We provide a preliminary analysis on the impact of COVID‑19 on the sector as well as an update on its growth.

One year later, we review the events that took place in Canadian fixed-income markets at the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis and propose potential policy research questions for future work.

Raising liquidity when funding is stressed creates pressure on the financial market. Liquidating large quantities of assets depresses their prices and may amplify funding shocks. How do banks weathering a funding crisis contribute to contagion risk?

Severe disruptions in the financial markets, as observed during the 2008 global financial crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic, can impair the stability of the entire financial system and worsen macroeconomic downturns.

This equilibrium model explains the trend in long-term yields and business-cycle movements in short-term yields and yield spreads. The less-frequent inverted yield curves (and less-frequent recessions) after the 1990s are due to recent secular stagnation and procyclical inflation expectations.

Models for macroeconomic forecasts do not usually take into account the risk of a crisis—that is, a sudden large decline in gross domestic product (GDP). However, policy-makers worry about such GDP tail risk because of its large social and economic costs.

We examine loan insurance—credit risk transfer upon origination—in a model in which lenders can screen, learn loan quality over time, and can sell loans. Some lenders with low screening ability insure, benefiting from higher market liquidity of insured loans while forgoing the option to exploit future information about loan quality.