The Framework for Risk Identification and Assessment Technical report No. 113 Cameron MacDonald, Virginie Traclet Risk assessment models are an important component of the Bank’s analytical tool kit for assessing the resilience of the financial system. We describe the Framework for Risk Identification and Assessment (FRIDA), a suite of models developed at the Bank of Canada to quantify the impact of financial stability risks to the broader economy and a range of financial system participants (households, businesses and banks). Content Type(s): Staff research, Technical reports JEL Code(s): C, C3, C5, C6, C7, D, D1, E, E0, E00, E2, E27, E3, E37, E4, E47, G, G0, G2, G21 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk, Models and tools, Economic models
Calibrating the Magnitude of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer Using Market-Based Stress Tests Staff working paper 2018-54 Maarten van Oordt How much capital do banks need as a buffer to absorb severe shocks? By using historical stock market data, market-based stress tests help estimate the magnitude of capital buffers necessary to absorb severe but plausible shocks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G2, G21, G28 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight
Multibank Holding Companies and Bank Stability Staff working paper 2018-51 Radoslav Raykov, Consuelo Silva-Buston This paper studies the relationship between bank holding company affiliation and the individual and systemic risk of banks. Using the 2005 hurricane season in the US as an exogenous shock to bank balance sheets, we show that banks that are part of a holding parent company are more resilient than independent banks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G1, G2 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk
Government of Canada Fixed-Income Market Ecology Staff discussion paper 2018-10 Léanne Berger-Soucy, Corey Garriott, André Usche This discussion paper is the third in the Financial Markets Department’s series on the structure of Canadian financial markets. These papers are called “ecologies” because they study the interactions among market participants, infrastructures, regulations and the terms of the traded contract itself. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G2, G20, H, H6, H63 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Funds management, Market functioning, Market structure
Should Bank Capital Regulation Be Risk Sensitive? Staff working paper 2018-48 Toni Ahnert, James Chapman, Carolyn A. Wilkins We present a simple model to study the risk sensitivity of capital regulation. A banker funds investment with uninsured deposits and costly capital, where capital resolves a moral hazard problem in the banker’s choice of risk. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G28 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight
Blockchain-Based Settlement for Asset Trading Staff working paper 2018-45 Jonathan Chiu, Thorsten Koeppl Can securities be settled on a blockchain and, if so, what are the gains relative to existing settlement systems? We consider a blockchain that ensures delivery versus payment by linking transfers of assets with payments and operates using a proof-of-work protocol. The main benefit of a blockchain is faster and more flexible settlement, whereas the challenge is to avoid settlement fails when participants fork the chain to get rid of trading losses. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G2, H, H4, P, P4, P43 Research Theme(s): Money and payments, Digital assets and fintech, Payment and financial market infrastructures
Seeking Safety Staff working paper 2018-41 Toni Ahnert, Enrico Perotti The scale of safe assets suggests a structural demand for a safe wealth share beyond transaction and liquidity roles. We study how investors achieve a reference wealth level by combining self-insurance and contingent liquidation of investment. Intermediaries improve upon autarky, insuring investors with poor self-insurance and limiting liquidation. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G2 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk
Prudential Liquidity Regulation in Banking—A Literature Review Staff discussion paper 2018-8 Adi Mordel Prudential liquidity requirements are a relatively recent regulatory tool on the international front, introduced as part of the Basel III accord in the form of a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and a net stable funding ratio (NSFR). I first discuss the rationale for regulating bank liquidity by highlighting the market failures that it addresses while reviewing key theoretical contributions to the literature on the motivation for prudential liquidity regulation. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G28 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight
The Impact of Government Debt Supply on Bond Market Liquidity: An Empirical Analysis of the Canadian Market Staff working paper 2018-35 Jeffrey Gao, Jianjian Jin, Jacob Thompson This paper finds that Government of Canada benchmark bonds tend to be more illiquid over the subsequent month when there is a large increase in government debt supply. The result is both statistically and economically significant, stronger for the long-term than the short-term sector, and is robust when other macro factors are controlled for. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): D, D5, D53, G, G1, G12, G18, G2, G3, G32 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Funds management, Market functioning
Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain Staff working paper 2018-34 Jonathan Chiu, Thorsten Koeppl A blockchain is a digital ledger that keeps track of a record of ownership without the need for a designated party to update and enforce changes to the record. The updating of the ledger is done directly by the users of the blockchain and is traditionally governed by a proof-of-work (PoW) protocol. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G2, H, H4, P, P4, P43 Research Theme(s): Models and tools, Economic models, Money and payments, Digital assets and fintech, Payment and financial market infrastructures