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Many derivatives markets use collateral requirements calculated with industry-standard but dated methods that are not designed with systemic risk in mind. This paper explores whether the conservative nature of conventional collateral requirements outweighs their lack of consideration of systemic risk.

This issue features four articles that present research and analysis by Bank staff. The first focuses on reforming the international monetary system; the second on the role of collateral and haircut policy in central bank lending; and the third on the extraction of information from the Business Outlook Survey using principal-component analysis. The fourth reviews studies that model the counterfeiting of bank notes.

Cover page

Promissory Notes

The notes featured on the cover measure approximately 21 cm x 8 cm and form part of the National Currency Collection, Bank of Canada.

Photography by Gord Carter, Ottawa

We measure soft information contained in the congressional testimonies of U.S. Federal Reserve Chairs and analyze its effect on financial markets. Increases in the Chair’s text-, voice-, or face-emotion indices during these testimonies generally raise stock prices and lower their volatility.

This issue includes analysis of the unconventional monetary policies recently implemented by central banks, and also presents Bank research in two areas - the migration of labour between economic regions in Canada, and the asset-allocation and funding decisions for Canada’s foreign exchange reserves.

We evaluate, both empirically and theoretically, the spillover effects that debt-financed fiscal policy interventions of the United States have on other economies. We consider a two-country model with international portfolio rebalancing effects. We show that US fiscal expansions would increase global long-term rates and hinder economic activity in the rest of the world.

Deposit insurance protects depositors from failing banks, thus making insured deposits risk-free. When a deposit insurance limit is increased, some deposits that previously were uninsured become insured, thereby increasing the share of risk-free assets in households’ portfolios. This increase cannot simply be undone by households, because to invest in uninsured deposits, a household must first invest in insured deposits up to the limit. This basic insight is the starting point of the analysis in this paper.

We simulate introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) and consider consumer adoption, merchant acceptance and usage at the point of sale. Modest adoption frictions significantly inhibit CBDC market penetration along all three dimensions. Incumbent responses to restore pre-CBDC market shares are moderate to small and further reduce the impact of a CBDC.

We propose a macroeconomic model in which adverse selection in investment drives the amplification of macroeconomic fluctuations, in line with prominent roles played by the credit crunch and collapse of the asset-backed security market in the financial crisis.

Commentary and technical data relating to the 2011 target renewal.