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2170 Results

Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty: Practice Versus Theory

Staff discussion paper 2017-13 Rhys R. Mendes, Stephen Murchison, Carolyn A. Wilkins
For central banks, conducting policy in an environment of uncertainty is a daily fact of life. This uncertainty can take many forms, ranging from incomplete knowledge of the correct economic model and data to future economic and geopolitical events whose precise magnitudes and effects cannot be known with certainty.

Portfolio Rebalancing Channel and the Effects of Large-Scale Stock and Bond Purchases

Staff working paper 2025-38 Sami Alpanda, Serdar Kabaca
We quantify the effects of large-scale stock purchases by a central bank and compare these to bond purchases. We find that the central bank’s equity purchases would lower the risk and term premiums on stocks and long-term bonds, respectively, and thereby stimulate economic activity.
April 7, 2009

Price-Level Uncertainty, Price-Level Targeting, and Nominal Debt Contracts

Many central banks around the world have embraced inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework. Interest is growing, however, in price-level targeting as an alternative. The choice of frameworks has important consequences for financial contracts, most of which are not fully indexed to the price level. Changes in the price level therefore lead to changes in the real value of contracts.

Fixed-income dealing and central bank interventions

Staff analytical note 2022-9 David Cimon, Adrian Walton
We summarize the theoretical model of central bank asset purchases developed in Cimon and Walton (2022). The model helps us understand how asset purchases ease pressures on investment dealers to restore market conditions in a crisis.

Limiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion

Staff working paper 2019-10 Shota Ichihashi
This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate.
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