Staff working papers

In a laboratory experiment, we ask participants to predict inflation using three different policy regimes: inflation targeting—with and without greater communication of the target—average inflation targeting and price level targeting. We use participants’ predictions to compare the level and stability of inflation under each regime.

The Great Recession and current pandemic have focused attention on the constraint on nominal interest rates from the effective lower bound.

Policy implications are derived for an inflation-targeting central bank, whose credibility is endogenous and depends on its past ability to achieve its targets. This is done in a New Keynesian framework with heterogeneous and boundedly rational expectations.

This paper studies the cost of limited commitment when a central bank has the discretion to adjust policy whenever the costs of honoring its past commitments become high. Specifically, we consider a central bank that seeks to implement optimal policy in a New Keynesian model by committing to a price-level target path.

Recent international experience with the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates has rekindled interest in the benefits of inflation targets above 2 per cent. We evaluate whether an increase in the inflation target to 3 or 4 per cent could improve macroeconomic stability in the Canadian economy.

Specifications of the Federal Reserve target rate that have more realistic features mitigate in-sample over-fitting and are favored in the data.