Gino Cateau was appointed Deputy Managing Director of the Bank’s Financial Stability Department (FSD), effective March 18, 2019. In this capacity, he is a member of the Bank’s senior management team, providing leadership and strategic direction to FSD, and helping oversee analysis and research on risks to financial stability and their implications for policy.
Gino joined the Bank in 2004 as a Senior Analyst with the Canadian Economic Analysis Department and has since held increasingly senior positions, most recently a Senior Policy Director in the International Economic Analysis Department. He has worked on the assessment of household vulnerabilities, developed macroeconomic models with financial linkages to analyze the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy, analyzed the implications of uncertainty on monetary policy decisions, and the design of robust policy frameworks.
Born in Mauritius, Gino has a BSc and MSc in econometrics and mathematical economics from the London School of Economics, and a PhD in economics from the University of Chicago.
This paper studies the cost of limited commitment when a central bank has the discretion to adjust policy whenever the costs of honoring its past commitments become high. Specifically, we consider a central bank that seeks to implement optimal policy in a New Keynesian model by committing to a price-level target path.
Over the past decade, an increasing proportion of households in Canada have become highly indebted relative to their income. These highly indebted households now hold one-fifth of total Canadian household debt.Simulations suggest that this greater degree of household indebtedness could exacerbate the impact of shocks to income and interest rates relative to the pre-crisis period. However, an assessment of the vulnerability of the Canadian financial system should, among other factors, account for the ability of Canadian financial institutions to withstand losses from the household sector.
We construct a small-open-economy, New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model with real-financial linkages to analyze the effects of financial shocks and macroprudential policies on the Canadian economy. Our model has four key features.
This article examines recent research on the influence of various forms of economic uncertainty on the performance of different classes of monetary policy rules: from simple rules to fully optimal monetary policy under commitment. The authors explain why uncertainty matters in the design of monetary policy rules and provide quantitative examples from the recent literature. They also present results for several policy rules in ToTEM, the Bank of Canada's main model for projection and analysis, including rules that respond to price level, rather than to inflation.
Using the Bank of Canada's main projection and policy-analysis model, ToTEM, this paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Following the policy change, private agents assign a probability to the event that the policy-maker will revert to inflation-targeting next period.