Search

The Bank of Canada is using an enhanced dataset that tracks the stock of outstanding mortgages and home equity lines of credit held by federally regulated lenders. This paper highlights some of the new details in the dataset and how they impact the Bank’s understanding of the mortgage market.

We draw on the Canadian experience to examine how monetary and macroprudential policies interact and possibly complement each other in achieving their respective price and financial stability objectives.

We find that foreign central banks own a large share of Government of Canada (GoC) bonds and tend to hold their positions for longer than other types of asset managers. This buy-and-hold behaviour could offer benefits. For example, foreign central banks may be less likely than other asset managers to sell bonds and add to strains on market liquidity in periods of turmoil. However, foreign central banks’ buy-and-hold behaviour combined with their minimal lending of GoC bonds in securities-financing markets, as observed in our available data, can potentially lower liquidity because fewer GoC bonds are available for others to transact in secondary markets. Indeed, we find that higher levels of foreign central banks’ GoC bond holdings are related to lower liquidity.

Derivatives exchanges often determine collateral requirements, which are fundamental to market safety, with dated risk models assuming normal returns. However, derivatives returns are heavy-tailed, which leads to the systematic under-collection of collateral (margin). This paper uses extreme value theory (EVT) to evaluate the cost of this margin inadequacy to market participants in the event of default.

This note analyzes mortgage stress tests, a macroprudential tool. We find that when mortgage stress tests are applied to all mortgage purchase originations, they improve credit quality and reduce credit and house price growth. They also improve the resilience of borrowers to financial shocks, such as the large increase in interest rates during 2022–23.

This paper introduces and estimates a structural model of the Canadian primary market for government debt. We assess the role of dealer exit in this market as a key reason for increased, yet irregular, customer entry and quantify the benefits of greater customer competition against the costs of higher market volatility.

Using a general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and financial frictions, we explore whether introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) affects the transmission of monetary policy, and how the effects depend on CBDC design features. We also study whether paying interest on central bank liabilities is contractionary or expansionary.

We study a government policy that restricts repayment choices with the aim of reducing credit card debt and estimate its effects by applying a difference-in-differences methodology to comprehensive credit-reporting data about Canadian consumers. We find the policy has trade-offs: reducing revolving debt comes at a cost of reducing credit access, and potentially increasing delinquency.

I analyze the relationship between carrying a credit card balance and future financial stress. I find that carrying a balance significantly increases the likelihood that credit card holders miss future debt payments. This likelihood tends to rise as credit card balances grow and are held for long periods.

We find that on any given day, nearly half of Government of Canada bond transactions by clients of dealers can be offset with other clients, including during the turmoil in March 2020. Our results show that under certain conditions clients could potentially trade directly with each other and are a step towards understanding the relevance of broader all-to-all trading in the Government of Canada bond market.