J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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Capital Structure, Pay Structure and Job Termination
We develop a model to analyze the link between financial leverage, worker pay structure and the risk of job termination. Contrary to the conventional view, we show that even in the absence of any agency problem among workers, variable pay can be optimal despite workers being risk averse and firms risk neutral. -
The Carrot and the Stick: The Business Cycle Implications of Incentive Pay in the Labor Search Model
This paper considers a real business cycle model with labor search frictions where two types of incentive pay are explicitly introduced following the insights from the micro literature on performance pay (e.g. Lazear, 1986). -
Asking About Wages: Results from the Bank of Canada’s Wage Setting Survey of Canadian Companies
The Bank of Canada conducted a Wage Setting Survey with a sample of 200 private sector firms from mid-October 2007 to May 2008. Results indicate that wage adjustments for the Canadian non-union private workforce are overwhelmingly time dependent, with a fixed duration of one year, and are clustered in the first four months of the year, suggesting that wage stickiness may not be constant over the year. -
The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEO Pay for Luck
According to the rent-extraction hypothesis, weak corporate governance allows entrenched CEOs to capture the pay-setting process and benefit from events outside of their control – get paid for luck.