J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

• Capital Structure, Pay Structure and Job Termination

  Staff Working Paper 2016-12 Jason Allen, James R. Thompson

  We develop a model to analyze the link between financial leverage, worker pay structure and the risk of job termination. Contrary to the conventional view, we show that even in the absence of any agency problem among workers, variable pay can be optimal despite workers being risk averse and firms risk neutral.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Labour markets JEL Code(s): G, G2, G24, J, J3, J33

• The Carrot and the Stick: The Business Cycle Implications of Incentive Pay in the Labor Search Model

  Staff Working Paper 2015-35 Julien Champagne

  This paper considers a real business cycle model with labor search frictions where two types of incentive pay are explicitly introduced following the insights from the micro literature on performance pay (e.g. Lazear, 1986).

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Labour markets JEL Code(s): E, E2, E24, J, J3, J33, J4, J41

• Asking About Wages: Results from the Bank of Canada’s Wage Setting Survey of Canadian Companies

  Staff Discussion Paper 2013-1 David Amirault, Paul Fenton, Thérèse Laflèche

  The Bank of Canada conducted a Wage Setting Survey with a sample of 200 private sector firms from mid-October 2007 to May 2008. Results indicate that wage adjustments for the Canadian non-union private workforce are overwhelmingly time dependent, with a fixed duration of one year, and are clustered in the first four months of the year, suggesting that wage stickiness may not be constant over the year.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Labour markets, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): E, E2, E24, J, J3, J33, M, M5, M52

• The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEO Pay for Luck

  Staff Working Paper 2008-20 Teodora Paligorova

  According to the rent-extraction hypothesis, weak corporate governance allows entrenched CEOs to capture the pay-setting process and benefit from events outside of their control – get paid for luck.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Labour markets JEL Code(s): G, G3, G38, J, J3, J33, M, M5, M52