Inequality in Parental Transfers and Optimal Need-Based Financial Aid Staff Working Paper 2019-7 Youngmin Park This paper studies optimal need-based financial aid when parental transfers—unobserved by policymakers—vary across and within families of similar means. Using data on U.S. college students, I document substantial inequality in parental transfers, especially among wealthier families. I then analyze how this affects aid design aimed at reducing inefficiencies from borrowing constraints and the aid itself. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Fiscal policy, Potential output, Productivity JEL Code(s): D, D1, D14, D6, D61, D64, D8, D82, I, I2, I22, J, J2, J24
Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61
Monetary Policy Tradeoffs Between Financial Stability and Price Stability Staff Working Paper 2016-49 Malik Shukayev, Alexander Ueberfeldt We analyze the impact of interest rate policy on financial stability in an environment where banks can experience runs on their short-term liabilities, forcing them to sell assets at fire-sale prices. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial stability, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): D, D6, D62, E, E3, E32, E4, E44, G, G0, G01
Comparison of Auction Formats in Canadian Government Auctions Staff Working Paper 2009-5 Olivier Armantier, Nourredine Lafhel Using a rich sample of Canadian government securities auctions, we estimate the structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders. We find little evidence of asymmetries between participants at Canadian government nominal bond auctions. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Debt management, Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44, D6, D63, G, G2, G28