Credit and credit aggregates, Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial services, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, International financial markets, Lender of last resort, Monetary policy implementation, Payment clearing and settlement systems
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Losses from Simulated Defaults in Canada's Large Value Transfer System
The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) loss-sharing mechanism was designed to ensure that, in the event of a one-participant default, the collateral pledged by direct members of the system would be sufficient to cover the largest possible net debit position of a defaulting participant. However, the situation may not hold if the indirect effects of the defaults are taken into consideration, or if two participants default during the same payment cycle. -
Banks, Credit Market Frictions, and Business Cycles
The author proposes a micro-founded framework that incorporates an active banking sector into a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model with a financial accelerator. -
Central Bank Haircut Policy
We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of the collateral.