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The Bank of Canada completed its first resolution plan for the Canadian Derivatives and Clearing Corporation (CDCC) in 2024. To estimate the resolution costs, we apply the extreme value theory method to simulate the credit losses that would result from extreme scenarios where multiple clearing members default at the same time.

Can regulators keep pace with banks’ creative regulatory workarounds? Our analysis unpacks the trade-offs between fixed regulations and crisis-triggered rules, showing that the latter are especially prone to circumvention—and can trigger larger, costlier bailouts.

We introduce a history of macroprudential policy (MPP) events in Canada since the 1980s. We document the short-run effects of MPP announcements on market-based measures of systemic risk and find that MPPs can influence the market’s perception of large banks’ resilience.

Privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) could offer solutions to safeguard end-user privacy and meet rigorous data protection standards for central bank digital currencies. We consider how PETs can transform privacy design in financial systems and the implications of their broader adoption.

Derivatives exchanges often determine collateral requirements, which are fundamental to market safety, with dated risk models assuming normal returns. However, derivatives returns are heavy-tailed, which leads to the systematic under-collection of collateral (margin). This paper uses extreme value theory (EVT) to evaluate the cost of this margin inadequacy to market participants in the event of default.

We study a government policy that restricts repayment choices with the aim of reducing credit card debt and estimate its effects by applying a difference-in-differences methodology to comprehensive credit-reporting data about Canadian consumers. We find the policy has trade-offs: reducing revolving debt comes at a cost of reducing credit access, and potentially increasing delinquency.

This paper describes the ecology of automated market makers, which are the most popular decentralized exchange model for the pricing and trading of crypto assets within decentralized finance.

We study liquidity requirements in a framework with fire sales. The framework nests three common pricing mechanisms and produces the same observables. Absent risk-sharing considerations, the equilibrium is efficient with cash-in-the-market pricing; a liquidity requirement is optimal with second-best-use pricing; and a liquidity ceiling (i.e., a cap on liquid assets) is optimal with adverse selection.

Regulators need to provide effective procyclicality guidance, and central counterparties must design and calibrate their margin systems and procyclicality frameworks appropriately. To serve these needs, we provide a novel conceptual tool kit. Further, we highlight that the focus should be on the key margin system parameters in determining procyclicality.

A regulator would want to restrict dividends to force banks to rebuild capital during a crisis. But such a policy is not time-consistent. A time-consistent policy would let banks gradually rebuild capital and pay dividends even when their equity remains below pre-crisis levels.