Search

Markets for securitized assets were characterized by high liquidity prior to the recent financial crisis and by a sudden market dry-up at the onset of the crisis. A general equilibrium model with heterogeneous investment opportunities and information frictions predicts that, in boom periods or mild recessions, the degree of adverse selection in resale markets for securitized assets is limited because of the reputation-based guarantees by asset originators.

We review the nascent but fast-growing literature on central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), focusing on their potential impacts on private banks. We evaluate these impacts in three areas of traditional banking: payments, lending and liquidity and maturity transformation. We also take a broader look at CBDCs and highlight two promising directions for future research.

This paper studies the music streaming industry and argues that having exclusive rights granted by copyright law drives firms to offer exclusive content to lock in customers. I employ theoretical and descriptive empirical analysis, along with a dynamic structural model, to support the argument and explore policies for improving competition.

We simulate introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) and consider consumer adoption, merchant acceptance and usage at the point of sale. Modest adoption frictions significantly inhibit CBDC market penetration along all three dimensions. Incumbent responses to restore pre-CBDC market shares are moderate to small and further reduce the impact of a CBDC.

Quarterly Financial Report - Second Quarter 2018 - For the period ended 30 June 2018

Bank regulation presumes risks spill over more easily from large banks to the banking system than vice versa. Interestingly, we observe this is not the case. We find that the capacity to transmit risk is larger in the system-to-bank direction, leading to an increased default risk.

In a dynamic model with limited commitment, aggregate payout-based compensation induces managers to raise outside equity yet invest too little today. Per-share compensation eliminates the dilution motive and restores efficient investment, but it does so through slower capital accumulation that better protects incumbent shareholder value.

The purpose of the consultations is to obtain the views of market participants on issues relating to the design and operation of the Government of Canada domestic debt programs for fiscal year 2004/05 and beyond.

A conventional bond is a debt instrument consisting of a series of periodic coupon payments plus the repayment of the principal at maturity. As the name suggests, a zero-coupon bond has no coupon payments. It has only a single payment consisting of the repayment of the principal at maturity. The zero-coupon bond is sold at a discount and then redeemed for its face value at maturity. The return to the investor is the difference between the face value of the bond and its discounted purchase price. In this article, the author examines the investment characteristics of zero-coupon bonds. In particular, a type of zero-coupon bond known as a strip bond is discussed. A strip bond is created by stripping coupon payments from conventional bonds. The strip bond market in Canada has grown substantially since the late 1980s and is now an integral part of Canadian fixed-income markets. As well, the opportunity to trade in the strip bond market improves the liquidity and efficiency of Canadian fixed-income markets, thus helping to reduce the overall cost of borrowing to the government.

This paper documents Canada’s recent review of its sovereign debt distribution framework (DDF). Informed by a context of record-high debt issuance since the previous DDF review, along with comparisons with sovereign peers and insights from market participants, the review identified an important need to broaden Canada’s dealer base internationally to support a larger and more diverse set of investors.