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Staff working papers

Staff working papers provide a forum for staff to publish work-in-progress research intended for journal publication.

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33 result(s)

Adopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect Credibility

This paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credibility, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): E, E3, E31, E5, E52

Central Bank Performance under Inflation Targeting

Staff Working Paper 2007-18 Marc-André Gosselin
The inflation targeting (IT) regime is 17 years old. With practice of IT now in more than 21 countries, there is enough evidence gathered to take stock of the IT experience. In this paper, we analyze the inflation record of IT central banks.

The Welfare Implications of Inflation versus Price-Level Targeting in a Two-Sector, Small Open Economy

Staff Working Paper 2006-12 Eva Ortega, Nooman Rebei
The authors analyze the welfare implications of simple monetary policy rules in the context of an estimated model of a small open economy for Canada with traded and non-traded goods, and with sticky prices and wages.

Alternative Targeting Regimes, Transmission Lags, and the Exchange Rate Channel

Staff Working Paper 2003-39 Jean-Paul Lam
Using a closed-economy model, Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) have, respectively, shown that a policy regime that optimally targets nominal income growth (NIT) or the change in the output gap (SLT) outperforms a regime that targets inflation, because NIT and SLT induce more inertia in the actions of the central bank, effectively replicating the outcome obtained under precommitment. The author obtains a very different result when the analysis is extended to open-economy models.

A Simple Test of Simple Rules: Can They Improve How Monetary Policy is Implemented with Inflation Targets?

Staff Working Paper 2003-31 Nicholas Rowe, David Tulk
The authors evaluate whether an assortment of simple rules could improve how the Bank of Canada implements its inflation-targeting monetary policy. They focus on measuring the correlation between the deviations of inflation from the target and the lagged deviations of rule recommendations from the actual policy interest rate.

How to Improve Inflation Targeting at the Bank of Canada

Staff Working Paper 2002-23 Nicholas Rowe
This paper shows that if the Bank of Canada is optimally adjusting its monetary policy instrument in response to inflation indicators to target 2 per cent inflation at a two-year horizon, then deviations of inflation from 2 per cent represent the Bank's forecast errors, and should be uncorrelated with its information set, which includes two-year lagged values of the instrument and the indicators. Positive or negative correlations are evidence of systematic errors in monetary policy.

Price-Level versus Inflation Targeting in a Small Open Economy

Staff Working Paper 2001-24 Gabriel Srour
This paper compares two types of monetary policy: price-level targeting and inflation targeting. It reviews recent arguments that favour price-level targeting, and examines how certain factors, such as the nature of the shocks affecting the economy and the degree to which agents are forward-looking, bear upon the arguments.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): E, E5, E52

Gaining Credibility for Inflation Targets

Staff Working Paper 2001-11 James Yetman
In this paper, I consider a simple model in which agents learn about the inflation target of a central bank over time by observing the policy instrument or inflation outcomes. Measuring credibility as the distance between the perceived target and the actual target, an increase in credibility is beneficial to the central bank because it brings the policy consistent with attaining the inflation target closer to that required to attain the output target.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credibility, Inflation targets JEL Code(s): E, E5, E52
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