Martin Kuncl - Latest

• The Prudential Toolkit with Shadow Banking

  Staff Working Paper 2025-9 Kinda Hachem, Martin Kuncl

  Can regulators keep pace with banks’ creative regulatory workarounds? Our analysis unpacks the trade-offs between fixed regulations and crisis-triggered rules, showing that the latter are especially prone to circumvention—and can trigger larger, costlier bailouts.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): D, D6, D62, E, E6, E61, G, G0, G01, G2, G21, G28

• Monetary Policy and the Persistent Aggregate Effects of Wealth Redistribution

  Staff Working Paper 2021-38 Martin Kuncl, Alexander Ueberfeldt

  Monetary policy in the presence of nominal debt and labour supply heterogeneity creates a policy trade-off: a short-term economic stimulus leads to persistently reduced output over the medium term. Price-level targeting weakens this trade-off and is better able to stabilize inflation and output than inflation targeting.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): E, E2, E21, E5, E50

• Loan Insurance, Market Liquidity, and Lending Standards

  Staff Working Paper 2019-47 Toni Ahnert, Martin Kuncl

  We examine loan insurance—credit risk transfer upon origination—in a model in which lenders can screen, learn loan quality over time, and can sell loans. Some lenders with low screening ability insure, benefiting from higher market liquidity of insured loans while forgoing the option to exploit future information about loan quality.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G0, G01, G2, G21, G28

• Fragility of Resale Markets for Securitized Assets and Policy of Asset Purchases

  Staff Working Paper 2016-46 Martin Kuncl

  Markets for securitized assets were characterized by high liquidity prior to the recent financial crisis and by a sudden market dry-up at the onset of the crisis. A general equilibrium model with heterogeneous investment opportunities and information frictions predicts that, in boom periods or mild recessions, the degree of adverse selection in resale markets for securitized assets is limited because of the reputation-based guarantees by asset originators.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Credit and credit aggregates, Economic models, Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E3, E32, E5, G, G0, G01, G2

• Securitization under Asymmetric Information over the Business Cycle

  Staff Working Paper 2015-9 Martin Kuncl

  This paper studies the efficiency of financial intermediation through securitization in a model with heterogeneous investment projects and asymmetric information about the quality of securitized assets. I show that when retaining part of the risk, the issuer of securitized assets may credibly signal its quality.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Credit and credit aggregates, Economic models, Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E3, E32, E4, E44, G, G0, G01, G2, G20