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3 Results

Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences

Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov
Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61

Information Sharing and Bargaining in Buyer-Seller Networks

Staff Working Paper 2016-63 Sofia Priazhkina, Frank H. Page
This paper presents a model of strategic buyer-seller networks with information exchange between sellers. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers can share access to buyers for a negotiated transfer. We study how this information exchange affects overall market prices, volumes and welfare, given different initial market conditions and information sharing rules.

Labour Shares and the Role of Capital and Labour Market Imperfections

Staff Discussion Paper 2009-2 Lena Suchanek
In continental Europe, labour shares in national income have exhibited considerable variation since 1970. Empirical and theoretical research suggests that the evolution of labour markets and labour market imperfections can, in part, explain this phenomenon.