Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences Staff working paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market structure, Models and tools, Economic models
Information Sharing and Bargaining in Buyer-Seller Networks Staff working paper 2016-63 Sofia Priazhkina, Frank H. Page This paper presents a model of strategic buyer-seller networks with information exchange between sellers. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers can share access to buyers for a negotiated transfer. We study how this information exchange affects overall market prices, volumes and welfare, given different initial market conditions and information sharing rules. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): C, C7, C71, C78, D, D2, D21, D4, D43, D8, D85, L, L1, L13 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Market structure