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198 Results

Business Cycle Effects of Credit Shocks in a DSGE Model with Firm Defaults

Staff Working Paper 2013-19 M. Hashem Pesaran, TengTeng Xu
This paper proposes a theoretical framework to analyze the relationship between credit shocks, firm defaults and volatility, and to study the impact of credit shocks on business cycle dynamics.

Méthodologie de construction de séries de taux de défaut pour l’industrie canadienne

Staff Discussion Paper 2013-2 Ramdane Djoudad, Étienne Bordeleau
Default rates are series commonly used in stress testing. In Canada, as in many other countries, there are no historical series available for sectoral default rates on bank loans to firms.

Consumer Interest Rates and Retail Mutual Fund Flows

Staff Working Paper 2012-39 Jesus Sierra
This paper documents a link between the real and financial sides of the economy. We find that retail equity mutual fund flows in Canada are negatively related to current and past changes in a component of the prime and 5-year mortgage rates that is uncorrelated with government rates.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial services, Interest rates JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G23
November 15, 2012

Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets

Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria.

November 15, 2012

Monetary Policy and the Risk-Taking Channel: Insights from the Lending Behaviour of Banks

The financial crisis of 2007-09 and the subsequent extended period of historically low real interest rates have revived the question of whether economic agents are willing to take on more risk when interest rates remain low for a prolonged time period. This increased appetite for risk, which causes economic agents to search for investment assets and strategies that generate higher investment returns, has been called the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Recent academic research on banks suggests that lending policies in times of low interest rates can be consistent with the existence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy in Europe, South America, the United States and Canada. Specifically, studies find that the terms of loans to risky borrowers become less stringent in periods of low interest rates. This risk-taking channel may amplify the effects of traditional transmission mechanisms, resulting in the creation of excessive credit.

The Role of Credit in International Business Cycles

Staff Working Paper 2012-36 TengTeng Xu
This paper examines the role of bank credit in modeling and forecasting business cycle fluctuations, and investigates the international transmission of US credit shocks, using a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) framework and associated country-specific error correction models.

Canadian Bank Balance-Sheet Management: Breakdown by Types of Canadian Financial Institutions

Staff Discussion Paper 2012-7 David Xiao Chen, H. Evren Damar, Hani Soubra, Yaz Terajima
The authors document leverage, capital and liquidity ratios of banks in Canada. These ratios are important indicators of different types of risk with respect to a bank’s balance‐sheet management. Particular attention is given to the observations by different types of banks, including small banks that historically received less attention.

Price Negotiation in Differentiated Products Markets: Evidence from the Canadian Mortgage Market

Staff Working Paper 2012-30 Jason Allen, Robert Clark, Jean-François Houde
This paper measures market power in a decentralized market where contracts are determined through a search and negotiation process. The mortgage industry has many institutional features which suggest competitiveness: homogeneous contracts, negotiable rates, and, for a given consumer, common lending costs across lenders.

Efficiency and Bargaining Power in the Interbank Loan Market

Staff Working Paper 2012-29 Jason Allen, James Chapman, Federico Echenique, Matthew Shum
Using detailed loan transactions-level data we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market, and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no-arbitrage conditions on trades in the market.
August 16, 2012

An Analysis of Indicators of Balance-Sheet Risks at Canadian Financial Institutions

This article examines four indicators of balance-sheet risks—leverage, capital, asset liquidity and funding—among different types of financial institutions in Canada over the past three decades. It also discusses relevant developments in the banking sector that could have contributed to the observed dynamics. The authors find that the various risk indicators decreased during the period for most of the non-Big Six financial institutions, but remained relatively unchanged for the Big Six banks. In addition, the balance-sheet risk indicators became more heterogeneous across financial institutions. The observed overall decline and increased heterogeneity follow certain regulatory changes, such as the introduction of the liquidity guidelines on funding in 1995 and the implementation of bank-specific leverage requirements in 2000. Given that these regulations required more balance-sheet risk management, they have likely contributed to the increased resilience of the banking sector.
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